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CONDUIT-BASED REGULATION OF SPEECH
JIM CHEN†
ABSTRACT
Architecture is destiny. As much as information today determines
the contemporary wealth of nations, the physical world retains its
relevance. Architecture affects crime rates, arguably even collegiality
among professors. The interplay between the physical and the
ethereal likewise shapes the constitutional doctrine that facilitates the
free flow of ideas. The structure of a communicative medium
dictates its performance. Awareness of the structure of information
markets improves the calibration of intellectual property and refines
legal responses to potential electronic bottlenecks. This Article takes
the next logical step: revealing the deep doctrinal structure of legal
efforts to influence the design and maintenance of communicative
conduits.
This Article's examination of free speech jurisprudence begins by
describing how any communicative medium can be visualized as
three distinct physical, logical, and content-based layers. End-to-end
design, the Internet's operative ideal, also provides a crucial doctrinal
metaphor. Like the conduits through which communications pass,
free speech jurisprudence can also be analyzed layer by layer. Cases
involving the regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech
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comprise the physical layer, in which regulatory prerogative generally
prevails. By contrast, most forms of content-based regulation draw
strict scrutiny.
In a perverse twist of the end-to-end principle, the intelligence in
First Amendment jurisprudence resides at its edges. Though the
Supreme Court has achieved doctrinal stability in reviewing contentbased restrictions and time-place-manner rules, the Justices have
behaved erratically whenever they have examined the intermediate
logical layer—cases involving the regulation of specific
communicative conduits. The Court has not developed a cogent
approach to regulations designed to structure channels of
communication that mediate between physical space and eventual
expression. A generation ago, decisions affirming comprehensive
federal power over broadcasting practically defined conduit-based
regulation of speech. Broadcasting cases cannot be squared with strict
scrutiny of content-based regulation of speech. Since 1978 the
Supreme Court has proved quite uneven in keeping pace with
technological changes in communications. After locating the doctrinal
baseline established in the broadcasting cases, this Article surveys
more recent cases involving cable television and sexually explicit
speech in a variety of media.
Four interrelated rationales for conduit-based regulation of speech
have emerged: scarcity, regulatory intensity, the government's interest
in enhancing voices, and a conduit's pervasiveness. Although each of
these rationales is superficially plausible, deeper inspection counsels a
skeptical regard for the notion that conduit-based regulation merits
distinctive First Amendment treatment. This Article accordingly
disavows the strategy of adjusting First Amendment standards of
review in response to putative differences among conduits. In
reviewing conduit-based restrictions on speech, courts should remain
wary of disguised efforts to control content. The end-to-end principle
counsels simple standards for reviewing regulation aimed at the
logical layer of speech. Real information is ideally transmitted on
simple protocols that allow speakers and listeners to control all
intelligence within a network. Likewise, a constitutional jurisprudence
that minimizes reliance on conduit-based distinctions best protects
free speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Architecture is destiny. As much as information today determines
the contemporary wealth of nations,1 the physical world retains its
relevance. Even though firms in today’s technology-driven economy
derive much of their value from information and other “intangible
resources,”2 physical determinants of productivity remain critical.3
Architecture affects crime rates,4 arguably even collegiality among law
professors.5 Paradoxically, place may assume greater value in an
1. See, e.g., Andrea Bassanini et al., Knowledge, Technology and Economic Growth: Recent
Evidence from OECD Countries 3, 14 (Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 259, 2000) (relating growth
and labour productivity to countries’ significant technological changes and research and
development expenditures); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMIN.,
DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000, at v (2000) (noting that dramatic reductions in the cost of information
technology have spurred growth and labor productivity).
2. Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI . L. R EV. 3, 7 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 575, 578
(1999) (describing how Silicon Valley eclipsed Massachusetts’ Route 128 in the race to dominate
the “new economy”).
4. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002).
5. Daniel A. Farber, The Dead Hand of the Architect, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245,
246–47 (1996).
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information-based economy. “Place has become the central organizing
unit of our time, taking on many of the functions that used to be played
by firms and other organizations.”6
The interplay between the physical and the ethereal likewise
shapes the constitutional doctrine that facilitates the free flow of ideas.
“Physical settings shape expressive practices and expectations.”7 The
structure of a communicative medium virtually dictates its
performance.8 Wealth transfers within the new economy prompt “new
efforts by the government to intervene in the marketplace to favor a
particular outcome,” and in due course courts will entertain “new
constitutional claims” arising within the political economy of modern
communications.9 Awareness of the structure of information markets
improves the calibration of intellectual property and refines legal
responses to potential electronic bottlenecks.10 This Article takes the
next logical step: revealing the deep doctrinal structure of legal efforts
to influence the design and maintenance of communicative conduits.
To facilitate this Article ’s examination of free speech
jurisprudence, Part I describes how any communicative medium can be
visualized as three distinct physical, logical, and content-based layers.
End-to-end design, the Internet’s operative ideal, illustrates how logical
architecture affects network performance and how the law in turn
shapes architecture. End-to-end design also provides a crucial doctrinal
metaphor. Like the conduits through which communications pass, free
speech jurisprudence can also be analyzed layer by layer. Cases
involving the regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech
comprise the physical layer, in which regulatory prerogative generally

6. RICHARD FLORIDA , THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS : AND HOW IT’S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY ANDEVERYDAY LIFE 6 (2002).
7. David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of Code
Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1563 (2003).
8. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)
(arguing that hardware and software or “code” is a significant form of law); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L.
R EV. 553 (1998) (“Principles governing the treatment of digital information must offer stability
and predictability” to ensure “trust, confidence, and fairness . . . for citizens, businesses, and
governments.”).
9. Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
529, 531 (2000).
10. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era , 48 UCLA L. R EV. 925, 930 (2001) (“The
tremendous innovation that has occurred on the internet . . . . depends crucially on its open
nature.”).
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prevails. By contrast, most forms of content-based regulation draw strict
scrutiny.
In a perverse twist of the end-to-end principle, the intelligence in
First Amendment jurisprudence resides at its edges. Though the
Supreme Court has achieved doctrinal stability in reviewing contentbased restrictions and time -place-manner rules, the Justices have
behaved erratically whenever they have examined the intermediate
logical layer—cases involving the regulation of specific communicative
conduits. The Court has not developed a cogent approach to regulations
designed to structure channels of communication that mediate between
physical space and eventual expression.
Part II examines this doctrinal “logical layer.” A generation ago,
decisions affirming comprehensive federal power over broadcasting
practically defined conduit-based regulation of speech. In The Möbius
Strip of the First Amendment, Willia m Van Alstyne argued that the
broadcasting cases could not be squared with strict scrutiny of contentbased regulation of speech.11 Since 1978 the Supreme Court has proved
quite uneven in keeping pace with technological changes in
communications. After locating the doctrinal baseline established in the
broadcasting cases, Part II surveys more recent cases involving cable
television and sexually explicit speech in a variety of media.
Part III will identify unifying themes in the jurisprudence on
conduit-based regulation of speech. Four interrelated rationales have
emerged: scarcity, regulatory intensity, the government’s interest in
enhancing voices, and a conduit’s pervasiveness. Although each of these
rationales is superficially plausible, deeper inspection counsels a
skeptical regard for the notion that conduit-based regulation merits
distinctive First Amendment treatment.
Part IV disavows the strategy of adjusting First Amendment
standards of review in response to putative differences among conduits.
In reviewing conduit-based restrictions on speech, courts should remain
wary of disguised efforts to control content. The end-to-end principle
counsels simple standards for reviewing regulation aimed at the logical
layer of speech. Real information is ideally transmitted on simple
protocols that allow speakers and listeners to control all intelligence
within a network. Likewise, a constitutional jurisprudence that

11. William W. Van Alstyne, The Möbius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red
Lion, 29 S.C. L. R EV. 539, 539 (1978).
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minimizes reliance on conduit-based distinctions best pr otects free
speech.
I. FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE, END-TO-END
The structure of any communications conduit reflects the tripartite
division of human enterprise between production, transmission, and
distribution. Implicit in the structure of the Internet, among other
conduits, is the end-to-end principle. By simplifying communicative
protocols, end-to-end design drives all intelligence within a network
toward its edges, where speakers generate ideas and audiences respond.
Free speech jurisprudence should be understood as operating within
physical, logical, and content layers. Section A elaborates the threelayered structure of the Internet. Section B shows how the law of free
speech falls into three corresponding layers.
A. The Internet as Developmental Parable
Industria est omnia divisa en tres partes.12 Virtually every industry in
an age of mass production and consumption, “like ancient Gaul, is
divided into three parts”: production, wholesale transmission, and retail
distribution. 13 What is true of chrysanthemums14 and “the flow of wheat
from the West to the mills and distributing points of the East”15 applies
with greater force to electronic networks.16
12. Cf. C. IULI CAESARIS, COMMENTARII CUM A. HIRTI ALIORUMQUE SUPPLEMENTIS
R ECOGNOVIT BERNARDUS DINTER 1 (1890) (“ Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.”).
13. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 691 (1954) (Clark, J., dissenting); see
also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1937) (likening the operation of an
integrated steel company “to the heart of a self-contained, highly integrated body”) (internal
quotations omitted); Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927)
(characterizing electricity transmission as an industry “not local to either [the transmitting or the
receiving] state, but . . . essentially national in character”); cf. Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638,
643 (1984) (observing that manufacturing and wholesaling are not “substantially equivalent”
activities).
14. See Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1976)
(describing the three tiers of the chrysanthemum industry —breeders, self-propagators, and retail
florists).
15. Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 36 (1923); see also Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258
U.S. 50, 53–54 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290–91 (1922);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130–31 (1877); cf. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922)
(describing stockyards as “great national public utilities” dominating “the flow of commerce from
the ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East”).
16. See Thomas Reed Powell, Physics and Law—Commerce in Gas and Electricity —Interstate
or Local—Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 58 HARV . L. R EV. 1072,
1083 (1945):
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A similar tripartite model governs the spatial, legal, and social
infrastructure of communications. Network architecture dictates how
speakers and listeners interact. Every conduit consists of a physical
layer, a logical (or code) layer, and a content layer.17 The physical layer
of the Internet consists of network infrastructure. Common logical
protocols within a packet-switched, interconnected network transforms
the physical Internet into “a unique medium . . . located in no particular
geographic location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world.”18
Atop lies a rich content layer, the fertile output of the “most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed. ”19 Rife with “material
about topics ranging from aardvarks to Zoroastrianism,”20 that content
“is as diverse as human thought.”21
Standard accounts of economic development describe property as
the engine of growth.22 In an information-driven economy, intangible
property plays the heroic role of spurring innovation.23 But closer
examination reveals the modest contribution of intellectual property to
the Internet’s inventive potential, at least relative to the network’s open

[I]n the use of wires and pipes to get power and light and fuel into the service of
ultimate consumers, there is a trinitarian fusing of what in the case of chattels
embraces three distinct operations: (1) making; (2) going to market; and (3) selling in
packages suitable to the needs of individual customers.
cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. R EV. 281,
288–89 (2000) (arguing that Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994), and
Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997), would have readily upheld
mandatory carriage if those cases involved natural gas rather than video programming).
17. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562–63 (2000).
18. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850–51 (1997).
19. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J., concurring), aff’d, 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
20. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
21. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (principal opinion).
22. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1998) (discussing the ever changing notion of
property and its treatment under the Constitution).
23. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(describing intellectual property as designed “to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI . L. R EV. 1017, 1024–44 (1989) (listing the incentive to innovate as a
leading rationale for patents). But cf. Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of
Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. R EV. 1395, 1440–58 (1996) (urging the restriction of copyright to the
subject matter it covered in the preindustrial economy).
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architecture.24 The Internet’s most distinctive logical features have
arisen from the explicit eschewing of proprietary standards.25 Most
elements of the Internet’s logical architecture, such as HTML and the
TCP/IP protocol, lie in the public domain. 26 Only on the desktop, the
technological frontier at which most users encounter Internet content,
do proprietary markers begin to divide the terrain.
At the heart of the Internet lies its operating ideal, the end-to-end
principle.27 End-to-end architecture seeks to accomplish two related
goals. First, the higher-level layers, “more specific to an application, are
free . . . to organize lower-level network resources to achieve
application-specific design goals efficiently.”28 By contrast, “[l]owerlevel layers, which support many independent applications, should
provide only resources of broad utility across applications,” while
enabling applications throughout the network to share resources and
resolve conflicts over resources.29
End-to-end design places a network’s “intelligence” at its ends
while keeping all intervening protocols as simple and general as
possible. Providers and consumers of content may express themselves
creatively, whereas the network itself is “stupid.”30 The resemblance to
parsimonious computer pr ogramming is unmistakable. “By keeping the
network simple, and its interaction general, the Internet has facilitated
the design of” unanticipated applications such as “Internet telephony,
24. See generally Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA . L. R EV. 1163
(1999) (ascribing the Internet’s productivity to the application layer as the closest point of contact
with the typical user).
25. Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the
Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 768 (1999).
26. Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 290–91 (1998); Mark A. Lemley,
Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 745, 752 (1999); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28
N. KY. L. R EV. 822, 825–826 (2001); cf. TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL
DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 74 (1999)
(describing the decision to release HTML into the public domain).
27. See generally J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, CM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984), reprinted in INNOVATION IN N ETWORKING 195
(Craig Partridge ed., 1988).
28. David P. Reed et al., Commentaries on “Active Networking and End-to-End Arguments,”
12 IEEE N ETWORK 66, 70 (1998).
29. Id.
30. See David S. Isenberg, The Dawn of the Stupid Network, 2:1 ACM N ETWORKER 24, 26
(Feb.–Mar. 1998) (defining a “Stupid Network” as a network “based on abundant, highperformance elements that emphasize[] transmission over switching, as well as user control of the
vast processing power at the network’s edges”).
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digital music transfer, and electronic commerce.”31 End-to-end design
also promises neutrality vis-à-vis “new uses of the network”: “[N]ondiscrimination . . . invites innovation. It is a guarantee . . . that
innovation will be rewarded if the innovation is one that markets
respect.”32 The absence of a “centralized distribution point” makes it
difficult for “network operators or government regulators” to “stifle
independent information sources.”33 The “abundance generated by . . .
an open-access ne twork eliminates one of the key First Amendment
diversity difficulties found in mass media.”34
That the Internet currently strives to maintain the end-to-end ideal
does not mean that every conduit naturally achieves this streamlined
architecture. The debate over the application vel non of real property
doctrines to Internet traffic 35 fiercely disputes whether access to
websites should be governed by a rule sounding of nuisance within a
commons,36 or, alternatively, whether “a rule of consent supported by
judicial injunctions” should constitute the “default rule” for “access to
websites and proprietary networks connected to the Internet.”37 Neither
end-to-end nor proprietary design arises without deliberate legal

31. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 10, at 932.
32. Lawrence Lessig, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? , 52 STAN. L. R EV.
987, 991 (2000).
33. Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media , 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1624
(1995).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069–72 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(suggesting that the deployment of a software robot could constitute a trespass to chattels); Am.
Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 864 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that the
transmission of unsolicited commercial e-mail constitutes a trespass to chattels); Am. Online, Inc.
v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 246–52
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). See generally Bruce P. Keller,
Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law
Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property , 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 418–26 (1998)
(discussing the application of property law to Internet news sites and e-mail advertisements);
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an
Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001) (concluding that “a systematic
evaluation of the policy interests . . . supports more flexible property rules governing access to and
use of websites than those rules governing access to traditional real or personal property”).
36. Cf. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 48–49
(2000) (“The claim of trespass is to some extent an attempt to avoid a negative externality, that is,
the cost imposed by spammers upon network users.”).
37. David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI . L.J. 341, 341
(2003).
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intermediation. 38 Just as every form of intellectual property is dictated
by positive law rather than by nature,39 the law consciously crafts the
architecture of every conduit in order to achieve some set of regulatory
goals.40 No less than interpretation, network architecture is “normative
all the way down.”41 By regulating a conduit’s operative logic, the
government can control its content. That potential in every other setting
attracts serious judicial attention. It also warrants a closer look at the
logic of free speech jurispr udence.
B. A New Hope for Free Speech Jurisprudence
One can condense American constitutional law into a struggle to
reconcile two standards of review articulated in the early years of the
Republic.42 One standard prescribes deference to legislative
prerogatives; the other calls for strict scrutiny of suspect laws.43 The
former standard operates as a rubber stamp;44 the latter is “‘strict’ in
theory” but “fatal in fact.”45 Real confusion arises when the Supreme
Court attempts to bridge these extremes.

38. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 10, at 933–34 (contrasting AT&T’s network with the
Internet).
39. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. R EV. 1149,
1240 (1998) (“[C]opyright is itself an intervention in the market, rather than . . . the ‘natural’ way of
things.”).
40. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 58–60.
41. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1094 n.30 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generally Daniel A.
Farber, The Story of McCulloch: Banking on National Power, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 679 (2003–04)
(placing McCulloch in its historical context).
43. Cf. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 805 (3d ed. 2000)
(distinguishing between McCulloch’s “rational relation standard” as “the primary standard for
judicial review” and the “more rigorous tests” that legislation in certain contexts “must pass”).
44. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 110 (2003); Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 319–21 (1993); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–91 (1955). See generally , e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful
Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND.
L. R EV. 357 (1999) (noting that “an extremely deferential” standard of review has enabled “the
Court [to] reject[] rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions during a 25 year period”);
Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial Technique,
108 YALE L.J. 439, 439–43 (1998) (explaining that judges can manipulate “the three-tiered
framework” of rational basis review because they define both “the government interests at stake
and weigh them on scales of constitutional ‘importance’ and ‘relatedness’”).
45. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R EV. 1, 8 (1972); accord, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
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Constitutional protection of speech is no exception. Much of free
speech jurisprudence represents an exercise in drawing categorical
boundaries.46 The three prevailing categories correspond closely to the
three layers of a communicative conduit. On “track one,”47 contentbased regulation triggers strict scrutiny 48 unless the speech at issue is
worthless,49 less valuable 50 or more dangerous51 than “core” speech, or
not really speech at all.52 These exceptions aside, track one is very
protective.53 On this track, “government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its

concurring in the judgment); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 & n.36 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
46. See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 V AND. L. R EV. 265 (1981); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV . L. R EV. 22, 59–61 (1992).
47. Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free
Speech Theory , 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 921 (1993). The “track one”/“track two” nomenclature is
Laurence Tribe’s. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 791–92 (2d ed. 1988).
48. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.”); Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209
(1975) (“[W]hen the government . . . undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits
its power.”).
49. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words).
50. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (commercial speech); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel).
51. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (express advocacy of
violence).
52. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (expressive conduct); cf. Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 288 (1984) (upholding a National Park Service
regulation prohibiting demonstrators from sleeping on the Washington Mall). But see United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1990) (invalidating as applied a federal law that
crimina lized flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417–20 (1989) (holding that burning an
American flag is expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412–15 (1974) (finding that the upside -down display of the flag is
protected by the First Amendment). Some speakers are constitutional peons insofar as their status
denigrates their expressive freedoms. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
(students); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–91 (1987) (prisoners); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986) (students); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (prisoners); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prisoners); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 (1974)
(soldiers); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prisoners).
53. See generally Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68
VA . L. R EV. 203 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. R EV. 189 (1983) (“explor[ing] the merits and limitations of the content-based/contentneutral distinction”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U.
PA. L. R EV. 615 (1991) (criticizing the “broad content neutrality rule”).
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content.”54 “[S]ubject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions,”
track one forswears “governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals” in favor of “the principle
that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”55 Giving
“government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate”
would concede an unthinkable official monopoly “over the search for
political truth.”56 Track one’s dedication to the proposition that “one
[person’s] vulgarity is another’s lyric”57 vindicates the axiom “that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”58
At the other extreme, “time, place, and manner regulations are
acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication,”59 unless the government has dedicated its
own property for use by private speakers60 or the public at large has

54. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); accord Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535
U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
55. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
56. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980); accord City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981).
57. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
58. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
59. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); see also, e.g., Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[G]overnment may impose reasonable
restrictions on time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication . . . .’”); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (same);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (“It is an extravagant extension of the process to say that
because of [the right of free speech] a city cannot forbid talking on the streets through a loud
speaker in a loud and raucous tone.”). See generally William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little
People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of
Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 757 (1986) (criticizing the Court’s “cursory” scrutiny of “time,
place, and manner regulations”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
R EV. 46 (1987) (identifying the “time, place, and manner test” as a vehicle for “highly deferential
review”).
60. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(“The right to use government property for one’s private expression depends upon whether the
property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum . . . .”); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981) (“In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum
based on the religious content of a group’s intended speech, the University . . . must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.”).
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acquired some sort of speech-related easement.61 Weak scrutiny in most
physical layer cases typifies “track two” controversies in which
“government is concerned with the noncommunicative impact of
speech, not the message that is being conveyed.”62 Courts sometimes
apply no meaningful scrutiny at all. For instance, when government
shuts an adult bookstore to ban prostitution on the premises, the
government’s valid interest in fighting the sex trade drains all
constitutional relevance from the incidental closure of the bookstore.63
First Amendment doctrine contemplates a third track.
Government endeavors at times to speak in its own right, either by
operating its own communicative institutions64 or by subsidizing private
parties who propagate officially sanctioned ideas.65 “Track one and onehalf [blends] track one ’s concern with government’s control of messages
[with] track two’s concern with government’s allocation of resources.”66
Expressive conduct cases epitomize this track. The aesthetic and legal

61. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983):
“Public places” historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities,
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be “public
forums.” In such places, . . . the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations as long as the restrictions are “content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.”
(quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (“So long as legislation . . . does not abridge the constitutional
liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of
literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets. ” (citation omitted));
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and . . communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone,
Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. R EV. 233.
62. Alexander, supra note 47, at 923; see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and
Mandatory Payments, 52 R UTGERS L. R EV. 123, 183 (1999) (distinguishing efforts “to manipulate
the marketplace of ideas” from actions with “a nonspeech purpose [that] incidentally compel[]
expression”).
63. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (upholding zoning restrictions imposed to minimize the
“se condary effects” associated with adult theaters); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707
(1986); cf. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 441–42 (2002) (repelling an
effort to reformulate Renton).
64. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (public school libraries); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater).
65. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)
(university activity fees); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (federal
funding for artists); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(university newspaper); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (medical programs receiving Title X
funds).
66. Alexander, supra note 47, at 927.
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significance of clothing67 illustrates how “a message may be delivered by
conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in context,
would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.”68
By the same token, if a message hinges on the expressive value of
“sleeping [in] . . . symbolic tents” on public parkland,69 the government
may assert a countervailing “interest in conserving park property”
through “measures such as the proscription of sleeping that are
designed to limit the wear and tear on park properties.”70 Given that the
expressive conduct test of United States v. O’Brien71 “asks so little in
principle, it should not be surprising that it means so little in practice.”72
Public forum cases likewise typify track one and one-half.73 In
theory, public forum doctrine represents a departure from minimal
scrutiny of burdens on the time, place, and manner of speech.74 Yet the
doctrine settles far less than it promises. It resolves nothing to assert, as
public forum doctrine does, that the government may regulate the time,
place, and manner of speech in order to advance significant objectives
unrelated to the message being conveyed, as long as the government
neither bars speech altogether nor extinguishes adequate alternative
channels of communication. 75 Because alternative channels are never

67. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (“[T]he
wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that
is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”); see also Gil Grantmore, Lex and the
City , 91 GEO. L.J. 913, 913 (2003) (“[H]ow you dress expresses who you are. Or, in terms more
familiar to my audience, fashion is speech.”) (footnote omitted).
68. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 299.
71. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furthe rance of that interest.
72. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. R EV. 1175,
1204 (1996).
73. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37–38 (1983); see also G.
Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. R EV. 949, 950
(discussing the Court’s narrowing “of speaker access to fora controlled by government”).
74. See Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental
Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 779, 788 (1985) (“The [public forum]
cases support the view that even incidental restrictions on speech must meet more exacting
standards when the ‘public forum’ label properly attaches.”).
75. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. For Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); cf. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
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fully adequate, all regulations of public forums “will entirely suppress
speech with respect to some potential audience and with a particular
cognitive and emotive impact.”76 To describe the central problem of
public forum doctrine as “whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time ” is emphatically not to answer this “crucial question.”77
The same conflict between space and expression pervades “captive
audience” and “no place like home” cases, which attempt to reconcile
speech-related uses of circumscribed spaces with nonspeakers’ interests
in privacy, peace, and quiet.78
Situated between the physical and content layers, the logical layer
lies squarely on track one and one-half. Insofar as the logical layer in
communications intercedes between physical infrastructure and
ultimate expression, regulation of that layer combines an official
interest in resource allocation with an interest in content. Logical layer
cases oscillate between the relatively skeptical attitude toward contentbased regulation and the comparatively deferential approach to laws
affecting the time, place, or manner of speech.
This facile jurisprudential taxonomy begs a critical question: which
decisions comprise the logical layer? Contemporary communications
analysis treats “code” as synonymous with the logical layer. And “code”
in real space consists of the “constitutions, statutes, and other legal”
prescriptions that shape human conduct.79 Any expressive “medium”
consists of the “set of social conventions and practices shared by
speakers and audience.”80 The logical layer of free speech jurisprudence
comprises controversies in which the law structures the use of a

452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (addressing whether a state fair can require individuals “to confine their
distribution, sales, and solicitation activities to a fixed location”).
76. Alexander, supra note 47, at 924; see also Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to
Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First Amendment, 96 N W. U. L. R EV.
1339, 1408 (2002) (“[H]aving the Court assess whether sufficient communicative alternatives exist
is antithetical to the very theory of communicative manner, because such theory is based upon the
notion that the indiv idual speaker must determine substantive manner of expression for herself.”).
77. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
78. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 474–75 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471
(1980); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 298 (1974); Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)
(“Precisely because of their location, [residential] signs provide information about the identity of
the ‘speaker.’”).
79. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 6.
80. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. R EV. 1249, 1253
(1995).
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communicative conduit in putatively content-neutral fashion and in
ways beyond those dictated by the conduit’s physical characteristics.
The logical layer transcends strictly physical constraints and addresses
regulatory interests independent of content. Correspondingly, official
responses to a conduit’s logical characteristics, as opposed to its physical
or expressive traits, represent conduit-based regulation of speech. I will
treat the “logical layer” and “conduit-based regulation” as synonymous.
Consider conventional broadcasting. Yochai Benkler describes
“radio frequency spectrum” as part of the “physical infrastructure level”
of “the information environment.”81 This is not quite right. Spectrum “is
not a thing but a force (or more precisely a ‘disturbance in the force,’ to
employ Star Wars terminology).”82 A spectrum license grants the right
to transmit information, for a fixed period, at a stipulated frequency,
and in or to a particular location.83 Spectrum does not exist of its own
accord; it gains legal life once the FCC “determines the quantity and
location of frequencies to allocate for a given service,” decides how to
divide “the frequencies allocated for a given service,” and ultimately
“assigns licenses to particular entities” by comparative hearings,
auctions, or lotteries.84 Rights in spectrum are not “purely a natural
phenomenon, because the number of broadcast stations is more a
function of regulatory policy choices than a function of radio frequency
constraints.”85 Official decisions to divide wavelengths “into discrete
parcels and [to] licens[e] them for use so that interference is minimized”
effectively “create” spectrum.86 In a notorious instance of the interplay
between legal policy and spectrum’s physical characteristics, the FCC’s
relentless pursuit of localism87 fixed the number of national television
81. Benkler, supra note 17, at 562.
82. Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE
L.J. 899, 912 (1998).
83. See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 24–34
(2001).
84. Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (2002).
85. Robinson, supra note 82, at 910 n.40. See generally Harvey J. Levin, Federal Control of
Entry in the Broadcast Industry , 5 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1962).
86. Michael J. Burstein, Note, Towards a New Standard for First Amendment Review of
Structural Media Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1030, 1060 (2004).
87. See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 362 (1955) (holding that the
Commission could foster “local competition for originating and broadcasting programs of local
interest”); Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission’s Rules & Regulations, 41 F.C.C. 148,
167 (1952) (“In attempting to carry out these objectives, the Commission set forth certain
principles, in terms of priorities . . . . These principles were: . . . To provide each community with at
least one television broadcast station.”); THOMAS K. MCCRAW , PROPHETS OF R EGULATION 307
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networks at three for decades.88 Only the FCC’s decision to relax its
restrictions on television networks’ programming options broke the grip
of CBS, NBC, and ABC.89
The problem of crafting a First Amendment approach to the
logical layer transcends broadcasting. Whenever courts ponder whether
to adjust First Amendment analysis by conduit—FM radio, cable
television, the Internet, or direct broadcast satellite—the interplay
between regulation and the conduit’s physical attributes engages the
free speech jurisprudence of the logical layer. Content-based restrictions
that would receive withering scrutiny in any other setting (especially in
print media) suddenly enjoy greater vitality if portrayed as conduitbased regulation. To the extent that the entire First Amendment corpus
can be recharacterized either as content-based or as content-neutral—
after all, laws assertedly directed to “values unrelated to
communication, such as noise, congestion, property, aesthetics, or
privacy,” ultimately “have information effects” insofar as they “affect
what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with what effect”90 —the concept
of conduit-based regulation provides merely another channel by which

(1984) (“The lawmakers reasoned that if too many stations used the [spectrum] at once, radio
signals would become garbled and communication would be impossible.”). For a study of the
FCC’s preferences for free over pay television, incumbents over entrants, and single -channel over
multichannel technologies, see Christophe r S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local
Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003). Compare Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation
Politics Are Local: A Response to Christopher Yoo’s Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY
L.J. 233, 237 (2004) (predicting that better economic theory will not improve policy and advocating
better “institutionalized incentives” for policymakers), with Christopher S. Yoo, The Role of
Politics and Policy in Television Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J. 255, 255–56 (2004) (replying that
economic sophist ication enables politically motivated regulators to find policy-based justifications
for their decisions).
88. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 676–77 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL ., MISREGULATING
TELEVISION : N ETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC 14 (1984) (“The interaction of the [FCC’s]
choices . . . produced an overall national assignment plan for commercial television stations
adopted in 1952, that virtually guaranteed that no more than three full-scale, nation-wide
commercial networks could arise . . . .”); THOMAS G. K RATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
R EGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 88, 284 (1994) (“[O]ne dominant purpose and effect
of federal regulation of telecommunications technologies has been to retard the growth of
broadcasting . . . especially by limiting the number of broadcast outlets.”). See generally Thomas L.
Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The Federal
Communications Commission’s Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. R EV. 875 (1981)
(examining how policies before 1981 prevented the emergence of a fourth national television
network).
89. See In re Fox Broad. Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 3211, 3212 (1990) (granting a “limited, temporary,
and conditional” waiver of regulating constraints on the operation of a broadcast network).
90. Alexander, supra note 47, at 929 (emphasis omitted).
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courts may switch between track one’s libertarian jurisprudence and
track two’s pro-governmental stance.91
At least two-thirds of free speech jurisprudence is as cogent as any
other constitutional doctrine. “[D]espite its difficulty, complexity, and
controversiality,” track one is reasonably stable.92 By and large, contentlayer decisions are quite protective of speech. Regulations targeting the
time, place, or manner of speech face a different fate. Intermediate
scrutiny in the physical layer purportedly differs from “the rule of
rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional
challenges,”93 but the results suggest otherwise. “The sole consistency”
within track two “is that . . . the Government [almost] always wins.”94
Everything else defies description. Track one and one-half follows
no predictable, normatively defensible set of doctrines. Cases on speech
subsidies95 offer all the theoretical satisfaction of any body of law
involving potentially unconstitutional conditions.96 The logical layer
cases similarly confound ordinary comprehension. By failing to
incorporate awareness of any communicative system’s layers, the
Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence has ironically come to

91. See also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 424 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Nearly every human action . . . , and virtually all governmental activity, involves
speech.”).
92. Alexander, supra note 47, at 922.
93. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986).
94. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). As
of April 1993, Larry Alexander counted only “two clear and two less clear exceptions” to the
proposition that “[t]he government has always won track two cases.” Alexander, supra note 47, at
925. The two clear exceptions were Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), which invalidated
anti-littering ordinances as applied to pamphlets, and International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), which upheld literature distribution in an airport.
The less clear exceptions were Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), which
recognized a speech easement over streets and sidewalks, and Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), which struck down an absolute ban on live entertainment. I can think
of only one further addition: Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S 514 (2001), established the “novel and
narrow” right to “speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication,” at
least when the disclosure involves a matter of public concern. Id. at 517.
95. See generally Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
96. E.g., R ICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 6–16 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. R EV. 4,
11 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA . L. R EV. 1293, 1340–47 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV . L. R EV. 1413, 1415 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine Is an Ana chronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U.
L. R EV. 593, 594 (1990).
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resemble an end-to-end network: intelligent edges connected by a dumb
pipe oblivious to the content being transmitted within it.97
Free speech jurisprudence can also be understood in terms of the
Star Wars movies. Content layer cases decidedly favor individual
speakers, as though Luke Skywalker were the protagonist in every
controversy.98 Luke offers good company to the war protesters whose
tribulations gave birth to contemporary free speech law.99 If only the
Rebel Alliance would trade its lightsabers for gavels, this mythically
grandiose body of law, filled with valiant nonconformists, iconoclasts,
and dissenters,100 could be called “The Hero with a Thousand Cases.”
Track one has completed the cosmic cycle of “a separation from the
world, a penetration to some source of power, and a life-enhancing
return.”101
Other cases consistently uphold the government’s regulatory
interests. Darth Vader best personifies the physical layer decisions.
Especially when the government controls physical terrain cloaked in
emblems of sovereignty, rebellious uses such as protests harbor no
hope.102 All other cases are so outlandishly cryptic and so corpulent and
ugly that they might as well have been rendered by Jabba the Hutt.
There is another way to characterize the Court’s least satisfying
decisions. Their reasoning can be deciphered, but only after great strain,
and what the Court has to say is trivial and ultimately quite annoying.103

97. See Dale N. Hatfield, Preface, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 2 (2000) (“[T]he routers in the
internet perform what is basically a dumb function of forwarding data packets . . . . [C]ontrol is
shifted to increasingly powerful computers residing at the edge of the network.”).
98. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. R EV. 1405, 1408 (1986)
(connecting the street corner creativity celebrated in constitutional law with the romantic tradition
in art, literature, and music).
99. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 623–24 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Compare Daniel A. Farber,
Book Review, 15 CONST. COMMENT . 571, 571 (1998) (reviewing DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN Y EARS (1997)) (arguing that full understanding of contemporary free
speech jurisprudence depends on a grasp of “the generally repressive years from the end of
Reconstruction through World War I”), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 n.14 (1966)
(describing the “period from 1915 to 1921” as “not one of the enlightened eras of our history”).
100. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND R OMANCE 78 (1990).
101. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES 35 (2d ed. 1968).
102. See generally United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (post offices); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jails); Ronald A.
Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. R EV. 1287 (1979).
103. Cf. Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L.
R EV. 302, 340 (1984) (arguing that free speech jurisprudence has made speech “seem trivial,
foreign, and unnecessarily costly”); Post, supra note 80, at 1250 (criticizing current doctrine “for its
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Perhaps Jar Jar Binks would be a better mascot. Alas, either of these
George Lucas creations would aptly symbolize the logical layer cases. In
addressing these logical layer cases, this Article will tackle the daunting
task of translating from Hutt or Jar Jar Speaks into English.
II. THE LOGICAL LAYER OF FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Cases contesting conduit-based regulation of speech have varied, as
one might expect, by conduit. As of 1978, when William Van Alstyne
wrote The Möbius Strip of the First Amendment, this jurisprudential
“logical layer” consisted almost entirely of cases involving broadcasting.
The intervening quarter-century has confounded the Supreme Court’s
views of conduit-based regulation. This Article will now examine the
logical layer cases in three conduits: broadcasting, cable, and the
Internet.
A. Broadcasting ’s Special Constitutional Status
Courts routinely use technological changes to dilute constitutional
protection for speech in a new conduit. At a minimum, “differences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them.”104 Justice Jackson proclaimed
that each conduit “is a law unto itself”: “The moving picture screen, the
radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner
orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers.”105 Justice
Kennedy has advocated analyzing laws affecting new conduits “by
reference to existing elaborations of constant First Amendment
principles.”106 This habit has proved surprisingly durable. In conduitbased controversies, courts often try to derive “the operative metaphor
for freedom of speech” from “an appropriate analogy for the

superficiality, its internal incoherence, [and] its distressing failure to facilitate constructive judicial
engagement with significant contemporary social issues”).
104. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.”).
105. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
106. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 781
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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technology.”107 Rooted in broadcasting, this analogical technique
eventually yielded a comprehensive “Broadcast Model.”108
“[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has
received the most limited First Amendment protection. ”109
Conventional wisdom traces broadcasting ’s diminished constitutional
status to Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,110 the 1969 decision that
upheld a federal right-of-reply regime within broadcasting. To begin an
examination of broadcasting ’s special status with Red Lion, however, is
to neglect more than a quarter-century of constitutional history. In the
1940s, the FCC recognized that an increasing amount of programming
was not locally produced, but “transmitted by wire . . . from their point
of origination” by a national syndicate “to each station in the network
for simultaneous broadcast.”111 The FCC’s “chain broadcasting” rules112
eventually evolved into longstanding rules regarding network
affiliation113 and station ownership,114 territorial exclusivity,115 the
division of the broa dcast day,116 and network influence over
programming and advertising.117
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,118 the Supreme Court
upheld the chain broadcasting rules.119 Much of NBC has fallen to the

107. Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the Printing
Press, and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. R EV. 711, 712 (1997).
108. Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First
Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 254–66 (2003).
109. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
110. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
111. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 n.1 (1943).
112. See 47 U.S.C. §153(9) (2000) (defining chain broadcasting as the “simultaneous
broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations”); see also id. § 303(i)
(authorizing the FCC to issue “special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain
broadcasting”).
113. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a) (2005) (exclusive affiliation of stations).
114. The FCC once banned cross-ownership of a broadcast network and a cable system, but
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 lifted that bar. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 202(f), 110 Stat. 56, 111 (1996).
115. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.132 (2005) (AM radio), 73.232 (FM radio), 73.658(b) (television); cf.
id. § 73.3555(a) (duopoly rule).
116. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d) (2005) (station commitment of broadcast time); cf. id.
§ 73.658(k) (1995) (prime-time access rule), repealed, Radio Broadcast Servs.; Television Program
Practices, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,773, 44,773, 44,780 (Aug. 29, 1995).
117. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(e) (2005) (right to reject programs); id. § 73.658(h) (control by
networks of station rates). On the enduring impact of the chain broadcasting rules, see Christopher
S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy , 19 YALE J. ON R EG. 171,
182–87 (2002).
118. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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deregulatory axe.120 Even that decision’s most dramatic consequence,
the divestiture of NBC’s “Blue” network into ABC, probably would not
happen today.121 NBC’s constitutional legacy, however, is considerably
greater. In rejecting the network’s First Amendment challenge, Justice
Frankfurter reasoned: “Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who
use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression,
radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic,
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation.”122 Characterizing “[t]he facilities of radio [as]
limited and therefore precious,” NBC concluded that spectrum “cannot
be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public interest.”123 If any
decision deserves credit as the origin of conduit-based regulation’s
“scarcity” rationale, it is NBC and not Red Lion.
In strictly doctrinal terms, Red Lion represents a modest extension
of NBC. Yet Red Lion’s greater prominence vis-à-vis NBC is readily
understood. Whereas NBC involved the degree of vertical integration
and coordination in which a network could engage with local affiliates,
Red Lion targeted expressive, editorial decisions by broadcasters. The
rules in Red Lion subjected broadcasters to “broad rights of access for
119. Id. at 226.
120. The rule against dual network operation, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (2004), was relaxed under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §202(e), 110 Stat. 56, 110, which
required the FCC to amend that rule. See also Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference, 142 Cong. Rec. 1107, 1121 (Jan. 31, 1996) (explaining that the dual network rule still
bans the simultaneous or geographically coordinated operation of “(1) two or more of the four
existing networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX) or, (2) any of the four existing networks and one of the
two emerging networks[] (WBTN, UPN)”). Supervision of the broadcast day effectively ended
with the abandonment of the “prime-time access rule” (PTAR) as “an imprecise, indiscriminate
response” to network dominance of local affiliates. Radio Broa dcast Services; Television Program
Practices, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,773, 44,773, 44,778–79 (Aug. 29, 1995). In its heyday, PTAR inspired a
perverse “kind of Gresham’s law” that enabled “game shows and animal shows” to dominate the
half-hour between network news and the rest of the prime-time schedule “by default.” Nat’l Ass’n
of Indep. Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1975); see id. at
533 n.16 (observing that game shows were “the liveliest viewing available” (quoting The Quiz Biz ,
FORBES MAG., Apr. 1, 1975, at 48)); cf. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 476–79
(2d Cir. 1971) (upholding PTAR against a First Amendment challenge).
121. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 208 (1943) (observing that divestiture of NBC’s
Blue network eliminated any “immediate threat of . . . enforcement” of the dual network rule);
NBC v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (L. Hand, J.) (noting the Blue
network’s divestiture), rev’d, 316 U.S. 447 (1942); STERLING QUINLAN, INSIDE ABC: AMERICAN
BROADCASTING COMPANY’S RISE TO POWER 19–20 (1979) (discussing the divesture of the Blue
network); LEONARD H. GOLDENSON & MARVIN J. WOLF, BEATING THE ODDS: THE UNTOLD
STORY BEHIND THE RISE OF ABC 96–97 (1991) (same).
122. NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.
123. Id. at 216.

012306 02_CHEN.D O C

2005]

2/6/2006 10:18 AM

CONDUIT-BASED REGULATION

1381

outside speakers” that, in almost any other setting, would be
“antithetical . . . to the discretion” that the Constitution guarantees to
publishers.124 The Supreme Court evaluated “the requirement that
discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that
each side of those issues must be given fair coverage.”125 The personal
attack rule provided that “[w]hen a personal attack has been made on a
figure involved in a public issue . . . the individual attacked himself
[must] be offered an opportunity to respond.”126 The political
editorializing rule required a broadcaster who endorsed or opposed a
political candidate to offer all disfavored “candidates . . . reply time to
use personally or through a spokesman.”127 Unlike “the general fairness
requirement,” the personal attack rule and the editorializing rule gave a
broadcaster “the option of presenting the attacked party’s side himself
or choosing a third party to represent that side.”128
Red Lion upheld the fairness doctrine. Because of spectrum’s
physical limits, the Court surmised, “only a tiny fraction of those with
resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the
same time.”129 Thereupon the Court recited the classic formulation of
the scarcity rationale: “Where there are substantially more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to
posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”130 Although
the FCC abandoned the personal attack and political editorializing rules
in the late 1980s,131 the scarcity rationale endures. The broader interest
in a pluralistic media market of numerous independent voices likewise
survives.132

124. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998).
125. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
126. Id. at 378.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 388.
130. Id.; accord, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994); FCC
v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978).
131. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987); Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules
in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive
Deregulation, 76 GEO. L.J. 59, 60 (1987). These rules made a brief but abortive comeback in the
late 1990s. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(ordering the FCC to repeal the personal attack and political editorializing rules).
132. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 354, 367 & n.56 (1999) (noting the Court’s
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A mere five years after Red Lion, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo133 invalidated a state right-of-reply law practically identical to
the fairness doctrine. That law unacceptably compromised a newspaper
publisher’s “exercise of editorial control and judgment.”134 Tornillo also
condemned the compulsory access law’s compliance costs, measured
not only “in terms of the cost [of] printing” but also in terms of the
opportunity cost of forgoing “material [that] the newspaper may have
preferred to print.”135 The Court endorsed Zechariah Chafee’s warning
that “[l]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to
compel what is to go into a newspaper.”136 The “kind of forced
response” at issue in Tornillo—or, for that matter, in Red Lion—is
“antithetical to the free discussion that the First Amendment seeks to
foster.”137 The dissonance between Tornillo and Red Lion suggests that
many of the rules imposed on broadcasters would be unconstitutional if
they were applied to print journalists.138 Attempting to square both
cases “with a single view of the first amendment” has proved “a terrific
academic strain.”139 Rather notoriously, however, Tornillo never even
cited Red Lion.140 It is Tornillo, and emphatically not Red Lion, that
expresses Othello’s attitude toward intrusions on exclusivity and

concern that a “small group of powerful commercial organizations” might dominate “the
marketplace of ideas”).
133. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
134. Id. at 258.
135. Id. at 256.
136. Id. at 258 n.24 (quoting 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947)).
137. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion); see
also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797, 803 (1988) (relying on Tornillo to
invalidate a statute mandating certain disclosures triggered by the solicitation of charitable
contributions).
138. Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. R EV.
990, 1006 (1989).
139. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 544.
140. Roland F.L. Hall, The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising , 45
MERCER L. R EV. 705, 760–61 (1994); Jeffrey S. Hops, Red Lion in Winter: First Amendment and
Equal Protection Concerns in the Allocation of Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Interest Channels, 6
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 185, 190 (1998); see also FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE
BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT : FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 198
(1975) (“The Supreme Court’s inability to cope with Red Lion and Tornillo in the same opinion
suggests that it recognizes the inherent contradiction of the two cases.”).
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control: “I had rather be a toad / And live upon the vapour of a
dungeon, / Than keep a corner in the thing I love / For others’ uses.”141
Red Lion did not claim that the fairness doctrine or broadcast
regulation in general has no impact on broadcast content. NBC
acknowledged that the chain broadcasting rules transcended mere
“supervision of [broadcast] traffic”; they effectively “determin[ed] the
composition of that traffic.”142 Altering broadcast content, however
coarsely or subtly, is the raison d’être of structural regulation. For
example, expected differences in content were the only justifications for
the affirmative action policies in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC143 and
Lamprecht v. FCC.144 Metro Broadcasting upheld race-conscious
comparative licensing and distress sale policies on the assumption that a
“broadcasting industry with representative minority participation will
produce more variation and diversity than will one whose ownership is
drawn from a single racially and ethnically homogeneous group. ”145
Lamprecht struck down comparable rules designed to increase female
ownership and pa rticipation.146 Red Lion, by contrast, involved a far
more direct restraint on editorial freedom.
In the abstract, it is hard to gauge whether NBC or Red Lion
upheld the more aggressive program. Although comprehensive
structural restraints are arguably more confining than an overtly
content-based set of rules targeting an isolated set of editorial practices,
NBC suggested that structural regulation warrants less concern. That
case, and not Red Lion, established the federal government’s greater
discretion to regulate horizontal and vertical integration in
broadcasting, relative to the same economic phenomena in other media
markets. NBC so thoroughly sanctified the federal government’s

141. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Othello, act III, sc. iii, ll. 274–77, in THE OXFORD
SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 819, 837 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., 1988);
accord WILLIAM W. V AN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 77 (1984).
142. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); see also id. at 235–36 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (decrying the growth of the chain broadcasting rules beyond their original purpose of
curing “a problem of technical interference”).
143. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
144. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Thomas, Circuit Justice).
145. 497 U.S. at 579. See generally Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing Minority
Preferences in Broadcasting , 68 S. CAL. L. R EV. 841 (1995) (presenting econometric evidence on
the link between minority ownership and minority-orie nted programming); Matthew L. Spitzer,
Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting , 64 S. CAL. L. R EV. 293, 294 (1991) (examining the
“purported connection between a broa dcast station owner’s race or sex and the owner’s
programming decisions”).
146. See 958 F.2d at 398.
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presumptive power to structure broadcasting that a major 1956
challenge to the FCC’s multiple ownership limits in radio passed with
nary a hint of constitutional infirmity.147
The 1978 decision in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting (NCCB)148 embraced NBC’s deferential posture toward
structural regulation of broadcasting. NCCB upheld the FCC’s ban on
“common ownership of a radio or television broadcast station and a
daily newspaper located in the same community.”149 After extolling the
need to regulate a market whose “finite . . . frequencies” are “far
exceeded by the number of persons wishing to broadcast,” the Supreme
Court blessed the allocation of “licenses so as to promote the ‘public
interest’ in diversification of the mass communications media.”150 The
Court cited both NBC and Red Lion,151 even though NCCB’s crossownership rule much more closely resembled NBC’s chain broadcasting
rules than Red Lion’s fairness doctrine.
NCCB emphasized that its deferential approach would insulate
efforts to “‘enhanc[e] the volume and quality of coverage’ of public
issues” in broadcasting, but not necessarily “similar efforts to regulate
the print media.”152 Despite conceding that “‘the issue . . . would be
wholly different’ if ‘the Commission [were] to choose among applicants
upon the basis of their political, economic or social views,’” NCCB flatly
denied tha t the cross-ownership ban was “content related.”153 Averring
that the cross-ownership restrictions would “promote free speech,
not . . . restrict it,”154 the Court asserted that the ban and broadcast
licensing at large “preserve[] the interests of the ‘people as a whole . . .
in free speech.’”155 NCCB even praised structural regulation as a
noncensorial means for “‘enhanc[ing] the diversity of information heard

147. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (citing NBC in support of
the denial of licenses to applicants already holding five or more licenses without conducting
comparative hearings otherwise required by Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945)).
148. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
149. Id. at 779.
150. Id. at 799.
151. See id. (citing, inter alia, Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–77, 387–88
(1969); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210–18 (1943)).
152. Id. at 800 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 n.55 (1976) (per curiam).
153. Id. at 801 (quoting NBC, 319 U.S. at 226).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 800 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
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by the public without on-going government surveillance of . . .
content.’”156
By comparison, Red Lion set firm limits on scarcity as a defining
characteristic of broadcasting. Red Lion recognized the technologically
volatile nature of scarcity. Well before Red Lion, the Supreme Court
had identified the “rapidly fluctuating” and “dynamic [field] of radio
transmission”157 as “a field of enterprise [whose] dominant
characteristic” has been “the rapid pace of its unfolding.”158 “Advances
in technology,” Red Lion acknowledged, “have led to more efficient
utilization of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spe ctrum have
also grown apace.”159 Improvements in consumer electronics substitute
for spectrum by allowing stations to operate at closer frequencies and
lower power.160 Today the average household can receive thirteen
conventional television signals.161 Mindful of “[t]he rapidity with which
technolog ical advances succeed one another to create more efficient use
of spectrum space on the one hand, and to create new uses for that
space by ever growing numbers of people on the other,” Red Lion
thought it “unwise to speculate on the future allocation of that space.”162
The past four decades have fulfilled Justice Douglas’s interrelated
prophecies that “television viewers” would enjoy at least “400 channels
through the advances of cable television” and that scarcity would
become a “constraint of the past.”163
Red Lion apparently tried to confine its analysis to the
technological context of broadcasting circa 1969. Minimizing doctrinal
damage, after all, is one of the languid virtues of deciding one case at a
time.164 The modest protection of these dicta, however, yielded to the

156. Id. at 801–02 (quoting Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 954 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)); accord, e.g., LeFlore Broad. Co. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 458 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
157. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
158. NBC, 319 U.S. at 219.
159. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396–97.
160. J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. R EV. 1209, 1230 (1993)
(review essay); Yoo, supra note 108, at 272–73.
161. Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted
Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,064 (2000).
162. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 399.
163. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 158 n.8 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also id. at 102 (observing that “the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of
technological change”).
164. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1999) (“[M]ore fundamentally, minimalism is likely to make judicial errors less frequent
and (above all) less damaging.”).
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greater force of Red Lion’s holding. The most enduring statement in
Red Lion is not its formulation of the scarcity rationale, but the
assertion that “differences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.”165 After
Red Lion, courts assess “[e]ach medium of expression . . . by standards
suited to it.”166
B. Cable as Broadcasting ’s Economic and Legal Rival
In Red Lion’s immediate wake, the jurisprudence of conduit-based
regulation focused on cable television. Despite its origins as a
technology for extending broadcast television into “remote or
mountainous communities,” cable became a formidable competitive
threat.167 In the late 1960s, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over cable in
order to stem the flow of viewers and revenues away from UHF and
educational stations. Failing to anticipate that much UHF bandwidth
would “sit[] around for years collecting electromagnetic dust,”168
Congress buttressed the FCC’s localism policy by entertaining its own
proposals to curb cable’s “‘unregulated explosive growth.’”169
These policies clashed in the 1968 case of United Sta tes v.
Southwestern Cable Co. 170 Decided one year before Red Lion,
Southwestern Cable held that statutory jurisdiction over “‘all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio’” permitted the FCC to
regulate cable.171 The Court openly endorsed the Commission’s
objective of preserving UHF and educational stations as the

165. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
166. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); see also City of Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“Different communications media are treated differently for First Amendment purposes.”).
167. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994). See generally R ALPH
LEE SMITH, THE WIRED NATION (1972) (reporting on the rise of cable as an economically viable
alternative to conventional broadcasting).
168. IRA BRODSKY, WIRELESS: THE R EVOLUTION IN PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS 17
(1995); see also Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30
WAKE FOREST L. R EV. 1, 37–38 (1995) (noting that broadcasters resisted removal to UHF). On
the eventual failure of the UHF policy, see Henry Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform
of the Federal Communications Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 707–09 (1975); Note, The Darkened
Channels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75 HARV . L. R EV. 1578 (1962).
169. H.R. Rep. No. 89-1635, at 7 (1966); accord United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157, 175 (1968).
170. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
171. Id. at 181 (White, J., concurring in the result) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)).
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foundations of “an appropriate system of local broadcasting.”172 Having
rested exclusively on a reading of the Communications Act of 1934,173
Southwestern Cable implicated but did not determine the appropriate
First Amendment standard of review for regulations aimed at cable. It
remained unclear whether cable operators might enjoy the rights
enjoyed by print publishers under Tornillo, as opposed to broadcasters’
more restricted rights under Red Lion. In theory, the Supreme Court
could have elevated both broadcasters and cable operators to Tornillo’s
more generous level of protection. The Court acknowledged in 1979
that “[c]able operators . . . share with broadcasters a significant amount
of editorial discretion” over programming.174 In 1986 the Court
conceded that cable “plainly implicate[s] First Amendment interests”
and that the production of “original programming” and the exercise of
“editorial discretion over . . . stations or programs” enable a cable
operator “to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a
wide variety of formats.”175 The Court nevertheless declined to embrace
any specific standard of review.176
A contemporaneous trilogy of tax cases, however, had already
unleashed Red Lion in cable’s realm. The 1983 case of Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue177 invalidated an
ink-and-paper tax aimed at the print media, as distinct from other
businesses.178 The Court condemned exemptions that placed the onus of
this tax on the state’s largest newspapers.179 Four years later, Arkansas
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland180 struck a sales tax that covered
general-interest magazines while exempting religious, professional,
172. Id. at 174. On the role of UHF and educational stations as bulwarks of the FCC’s
broadcasting policy, see Benjamin, supra note 84, at 18.
173. Pub. L. No. 73–416, 48 Stat. 1064.
174. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 US. 689, 707 (1979).
175. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
176. See id. at 495 (“We do not think . . . it is desirable to express any more detailed views on
the proper resolution of the First Amendment question raised . . . without a fuller development of
the disputed issues in the case.”).
177. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
178. See id. at 585 (“Differential taxation of the press . . . places such a burden on the interests
protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the State
asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without
differential taxation.”).
179. See id. at 591–92 & n.15 (nixing a tax “because it targets a small group of newspapers”
resulting in “only a handful of publishers pay[ing] any tax at all, and even fewer pay[ing] any
significant amount of tax”); see also Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (nixing a
tax that hit thirteen daily newspapers but exempted four other dailies and 120 weeklies).
180. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
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trade, and sports journals. Ragland “involve[d] a more disturbing use of
selective taxation than Minneapolis Star”: a magazine ’s tax status in
Ragland depended “entirely on its content.”181
Minneapolis Star and Ragland established two principles protecting
the press. Singling out the press from other businesses and
distinguishing among speakers within a class are both objectionable,
even absent “evidence of an improper censorial motive.”182 Minneapolis
Star plainly spoke in “the language of strict, not intermediate,
scrutiny.”183 Ragland, however, did “not decide whether a distinction
between different types of periodicals presents an additional basis for
invalidating” a discriminatory tax as applied to the press.184 Minneapolis
Star, for its part, suggested that preferential taxation of the press might
be unconstitutional.185 If preferential taxation of the press indeed
offends the Constitution, then those four words in the First
Amendment, “or of the press,” may lose all significance.186 Perhaps “the
freedom of speech, or of the press” lacks the elasticity of such
constitutional phrases as “unreasonable searches and seizures,”187 “cruel

181. Id. at 229 (emphasis omitted).
182. Id. at 228; see also Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 (“Illicit legislative intent is not the
sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.”).
183. Benjamin, supra note 84, at 29; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512
U.S. 622, 659–60 (1994) (characterizing the level of review in Minneapolis Star as “strict scrutiny”).
184. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 233.
185. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 590 n.13 (noting that “differential methods of taxation
are not automatically permissible if less burdensome”).
186. Compare Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“The
publishing business is . . . the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional
protection.”), with First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797–802 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (countering the view that “the Press Clause . . . somehow confer[s] special and
extraordinary privileges or status on the ‘institutional press’” by asserting instead that the First
Amendment belongs simply “to all who exercise its freedoms”). See generally L.A. Powe, Jr., “Or
of the [Broadcast] Press,” 55 TEX. L. R EV. 39 (1976) (condemning the distinction between print
and broadcast media); Spitzer, supra note 138, at 1000–06 (reviewing various restrictions unique to
broadcast media); William W. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred
Position,” 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977) (describing the detrimental effects that could result if the
press were to succeed in claiming special First Amendment protections not available to all).
187. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that
the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology.”).
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and unusual punishments,”188 and “[C]ommerce among the several
States.”189
The Court completed its tax trilogy in 1991. In Leathers v.
Medlock,190 Arkansas taxed cable services while exempting
“newspapers, magazines, and satellite broadcast services.”191 The Court
rejected a cable operator ’s claim of “intermedia and intramedia
discrimination,”192 having found no evidence that “the tax [was] directed
at, or present[ed] the danger of suppressing, particular ideas.”193 By
failing to distinguish “the information service provided by cable . . . from
the information services provided by Arkansas’ newspapers, magazines,
television broadcasters, and radio stations,”194 Leathers invited the very
distinction that separated broadcasters in Red Lion from print
journalists in Tornillo.
By the 1990s, cable television emerged as “UHF’s savior rather
than its scourge” by finally giving UHF stations “technical parity with
VHF stations.”195 As a legal matter, however, the Supreme Court
stopped short of equating cable with broadcasting. In the first of two
cases named Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,196 both involving
a requirement that cable operators transmit the signals of broadcasters
requesting carriage, the Court reasoned that its “distinct approach” to
broadcasting rests on that medium’s “unique physical limitations.”197
Turner I distinguished Red Lion and other broadcasting cases because
cable “does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize

188. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (describing the Eighth Amendment as
responsive to “evolving standards of decency”).
189. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (“[C]ommerce, undoubtedly,
is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. R EV. 1355
(1994) (reviewing the history of commerce clause jurisprudence).
190. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
191. Id. at 443.
192. Id. at 449.
193. Id. at 453.
194. Id. at 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
195. Yoo, supra note 108, at 278; see also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the
Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s
“Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV . J.L. & TECH. 335, 419–20 (2001)
(“Interestingly, UHF-TV did not collapse. UHF’s signal transmission inferiority relative to VHF
faded due to a rising tide of cable subscribership.”).
196. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I).
197. Id. at 637.
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the broadcast medium.”198 Recognizing “rapid advances in fiber optics
and digital compression technology,” the Court predicted the quick
elimination of “practical limitation[s] on the number of speakers who
may use the cable medium.”199 The Court also downplayed “any danger
of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to share
the same channel.”200 Turner I rejected the suggestion that the Court’s
broadcast jurisprudence rests not on “the physical limitations of the
electromagnetic spectrum, but rather the ‘market dysfunction’ that
characterizes the broadcast market.”201 The “mere assertion of
dysfunction or failure in a speech market, without more,” the Court
held, “is not sufficient to shield a speech regulation from the First
Amendment standards applicable to nonbroadcast media.”202
Turner I nevertheless rejected strict scrutiny. “Given cable’s long
history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals,” the Court
observed, “there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that
the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or
messages endorsed by the cable operator.”203 The Court placed even
greater weight on “an important technological difference”: whereas a
“daily newspaper . . . does not possess the power to obstruct readers’
access to other competing publications,” the “physical connection
between the television set and the cable network gives the cable
operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the
television programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home.”204
In 1997 the Supreme Court reconsidered must-carry.205 Whereas
“the state of the record” in Turner I confined the Court to assessing the
government’s interests solely “‘in the abstract,’” an “expanded record”
enabled Turner II “to consider whether the must-carry provisions were
designed to address a real harm, and whether those provisions will
alleviate it in a material way.”206 The Court found that Congress had
garnered “specific support for its conclusion that cable operators had
198. Id. at 638–39; see also id. at 639 (“This is not to say that the unique physical characteristics
of cable transmission should be ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations
affecting cable speech. They should not.”).
199. Id. at 639.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 640.
203. Id. at 655.
204. Id. at 656.
205. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
206. Id. at 195 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663).
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considerable and growing market power over local video programming
markets.”207 “Must-carry,” the Court concluded, “ensures that a number
of local broadcasters retain cable carriage, with the concomitant
audience access and advertising revenues needed to support a
multiplicity of stations.”208 Justice Breyer’s partial concurrence noted
cable’s “physical[] dependen[ce] upon the availability of space along city
streets,” which imposes “a kind of bottleneck that controls the range of
viewer choice” and which therefore justifies “at least a limited
degree . . . of governmental intervention.”209
The Turner decisions’ narrow consensus dissolved in the chaotic
1996 case of Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC.210 No fewer than five opinions advocated distinct
approaches to First Amendment review within a new conduit. None
commanded a majority. Section 10(a) of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992211 permitted a cable
operator to prohibit sexually explicit programming on leased access
channels.212 Section 10(c) granted an operator the same power over
public access channels.213 Section 10(b) required operators to segregate
sexual explicit programming on leased access channels, block it
presumptively, and unblock it upon subscribe r request.214 Six Justices
agreed that section 10(b) ’s “segregate and block” requirements failed
strict scrutiny in light of less speech-restrictive means for filtering
sexually oriented programming. Three Justices, led by Justice Breyer,
voted to uphold section 10(a) under Turner I’s intermediate scrutiny
standard; a coalition led by Justice Thomas supplied three additional
votes under a strict scrutiny approach. Justice Breyer, joined by two
other Justices, also used Turner I’s intermediate scrutiny test to
invalidate section 10(c). Of the five Justices who agreed to strike down
section 10(c), only two—Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg—invoked
strict scrutiny under the designated public forum doctrine of
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.215
207. Id. at 197.
208. Id. at 213.
209. Id. at 227–28 (Breyer, J., concurring in part); see also id. at 228 (asserting that must -carry’s
“limited” burden “will diminish as typical cable system capacity grows over time”).
210. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
211. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (amending the Communications Act of 1934).
212. Id. § 10(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (2000)).
213. Id. § 10(c) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 531 note (2000)).
214. Id. § 10(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) (2000)).
215. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion declared that “no definitive
choice among competing analogies (broadcast, common carrier,
bookstore)” could justify “a rigid single standard, good for now and for
all future media and purposes.”216 Justice Breyer hesitated to allow “a
partial analogy in one context” to “compel a full range of decisions in
[another] new and changing area.”217 Justice Stevens’s concurrence
likewise declared it “unwise to take a categorical approach to the
resolution of novel First Amendment questions arising in an industry as
dynamic as this.”218 He echoed his previously expressed sentiment that
Congress should enjoy the flexibility to craft policies governing the
“unusually dynamic” telecommunications industry.219
Justice Souter, also writing in support of Justice Breyer’s plurality,
noted that “[a]ll of the relevant characteristics of cable are presently in a
state of technological and regulatory flux.”220 As broadcast, cable, and
online technologies converge toward “a common receiver,” Justice
Souter surmised, “we can hardly assume that standards for judging the
regulation of one of them will not have immense, but now unknown and
unknowable, effects on the others.”221 Combining skepticism that “it will
continue to make sense to distinguish cable from other technologies”
with faith that “changes in these regulated technologies will enormously
alter the structure of regulation itself,” Justice Souter confessed “that ‘if
we had to decide today . . . just what the First Amendment should mean
in cyberspace, . . . we would get it fundamentally wrong.’”222
Justice Kennedy excoriated the plurality’s refusal to anchor its
analysis to existing First Amendment models. “When confronted with a
threat to free speech in the context of an emerging technology,” he
urged, the Court should “analyze the case by reference to existing
elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.”223 He described
“the creation of standards and adherence to them” as “the central

216. Denver, 518 U.S. at 741–42 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 749; accord United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 207 n.3 (2003)
(plurality opinion).
218. Denver, 518 U.S. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring).
219. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 235 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
220. Denver, 518 U.S. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 776–77.
222. Id. at 777 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745
(1995)).
223. Id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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achievement of . . . First Amendment jurisprudence.”224 Despite
disagreeing on the disposition of the disputed rules, Justice Thomas
endorsed Justice Kennedy ’s adherence to established First Amendment
models. Condemning the “doctrinal wasteland” to which the Court had
consigned cable operators, Justice Thomas suggested “that cable
operators should enjoy the same First Amendment rights as the
nonbroadcast media.”225 He throttled Red Lion’s dictum that “‘[i]t is the
right of the vie wers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.’”226 Concluding that Turner I had undermined Red
Lion’s emphasis on “the rights of viewers,” Justice Thomas declared
that “[i]t is the [cable] operator’s right that is preeminent.”227
C. The Naked and the Lewd: Content-Based Regulation Online
The Turner cases and Denver plunged free speech doctrine into
chaos. Yet the resulting “clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an
opportunity.”228 Indeed, subsequent cases have hinted at a promising
solution. The key lies in the contrast between conduit-based and
content-based regulation. Recent cases adjust First Amendment review
according to whether the law targets content, focuses solely on the
physical context of speech, or straddles these worlds by controlling the
legal operations of a particular conduit.229 The direction of policy “in
electronic media cases” is arguably “driven by a renewed concern for
access interests, rather than indecency issues.”230 As a matter of
doctrinal development, though, the reverse is true.
Almost all of the decisions regarding conduit-based regulation of
the Internet have involved sexually explicit but nonobscene speech.
Speech of this sort warrants constitutional protection. 231 As a “great and
224. Id. at 785 (“Standards are the means by which we state in advance how to test a law’s
validity, rather than letting the height of the bar be determine d by the apparent exigencies of the
day.”).
225. Id. at 813–14 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 816 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
227. Id. On the notion that the ownership of property constitutes speech, see Mark Cordes,
Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. R EV. 1 (1997) and John O. McGinnis, The Once
and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. R EV. 49 (1996).
228. ALFRED N ORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 266 (1929).
229. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 6 (defining “code” in real space as consisting of the
“constitutions, statutes, and other legal” prescriptions that shape human conduct, akin to the
“code” that enables electronic communication).
230. Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First Amendment Doctrine:
Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. R EFORM 817, 825 (1998).
231. See, e.g., Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville , 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
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mysterious motive force in human life,”232 and as the most “intimate and
personal” of acts at the core of “one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,”233 sex runs
through United States Reports as if “emblazoned on the very heavens in
skywriting.”234 Due process entitles “two adults” to engage in “private
sexual conduct” with “full and mutual consent.”235 The First
Amendment protects an adult’s “right to read or observe what he
pleases” and “to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of his own home.”236 At least when it portrays consensual adult
sexuality with some artistic flair,237 pornography has provided a
constitutionally sanctioned outlet for those who suffer “the tragic
feeling of being endowed with a larger-than-usual capacity for love,
without a single person on earth to offer it to.”238
What enhances pornography ’s impact on the Internet, as opposed
to any other conduit, is creeping discomfort about parents’ technological
incompetence relative to their children. Ever since 1984, when home
television viewers won a de facto privilege to record programs and
heightened their interest in the ability to program VCRs,239 the
Supreme Court has entertained a parade of controversies in which
children’s grasp of communications technology has exceeded their
parents’. An embarrassing proliferation of media now eclipses what was
once broadcasting ’s distinctive trait of being both “uniquely pervasive”
and “uniquely accessible to children.”240 The Internet’s ubiquity and
user-friendliness—even Supreme Court Justices believe that
“[n]avigating the Web is relatively straightforward”241 —make it a
fearsome means by which “children may discover . . . pornographic
material.”242 Congress tries to prevent “the widespread availability of
the Internet” from providing “opportunities for minors to access
232. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
233. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
234. EDNA FERBER, GIANT 11 (1952).
235. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
236. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
237. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (summarizing the
Supreme Court’s approach to child pornography).
238. SALMAN R USHDIE, THE SATANIC V ERSES 24 (1988).
239. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding it
lawful under the Copyright Act to “copy a program for later viewing at home” or sell “machines
that make such copying possible”).
240. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978).
241. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
242. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 567 (2002).
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materials . . . in a manner that can frustrate parental supervision or
control.”243 Justice Breyer has doubted not only the willingness of
parents to monitor what children watch and whe re they watch it, but
also the ability of parents to enforce the decisions they do make.244 By
contrast, Justice Stevens “would place the burden on parents to ‘take
the simple step of utilizing a medium that enables’ them to avoid
[sexually explicit] material.”245 This preference reflects a “growing sense
of unease” with “the interest in protecting children from prurient
materials . . . as a justification for using criminal regulation of speech as
a substitute for, or a simple backup to, adult oversight of children’s
viewing habits.”246 These cases thus hinge on judicial instincts regarding
parental supervision in a technological environment that emphatically
favors the young.
Contemporaneously with Denver, Congress delivered fresh
legislation that would enable the Supreme Court to reformulate its
approach to conduit-based regulation. The Telecommunications Act of
1996,247 widely condemned for hobbling “a crucial segment of the
economy worth tens of billions of dollars” with statutory “ambiguity”
and “self-contradiction,”248 notoriously ignored the Internet except as a
transmission vector for porn.249 Title V of the Act, better known as the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),250 addressed the online
243. Child Online Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402(1), 112 Stat. 2681,
2681–736 (2000), (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231); accord Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 124 S. Ct.
2783, 2793 (2004).
244. See Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[F]iltering software depends
upon parents willing to decide where their children will surf the Web and able to enforce that
decision. As to millions of American families, that is not a reasonable possibility.”).
245. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 606 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 535 U.S. at 583 (plurality
opinion)).
246. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring); cf. id. at 2792 (majority opinion of
Kennedy, J.) (“Above all, promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category
of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much diminished.”).
247. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
248. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999); accord, e.g., Mich. Bell Tel. Co.
v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 323 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting AT&T
Corp., 525 U.S. at 397); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999).
249. See Barbara Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37, 55 (1999) (noting that Congress paid more attention to the Internet’s
pornographic potential than any other aspect of that medium); John D. Podesta, Unplanned
Obsolescence: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL L. R EV. 1093,
1109 (1996) (“[W]ith the rather major exception of censorship, Congress simply legislated as if the
Net were not there.”).
250. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, 133–36,
partially invalidated in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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transmission of sexually explicit speech. The passage of the CDA
sparked a collision between the strategy of adjusting First Amendment
review by conduit and the imperative of applying strict scrutiny to
content-based regulation of speech.
Reno v. ACLU,251 the first of the Supreme Court’s Internet-specific
free speech controversies, not only invalidated the CDA as a
transparent assault on speech but also reinstated Red Lion’s
multifaceted approach. Reno held that the Internet lacked three key
features that justified broadcasting ’s deferential First Amendment
standard: “the history of extensive Government regulation of the
broadcast medium; the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception;
and [broadcasting’s] ‘invasive’ nature.”252 Justice Stevens observed that
“the vast democratic forums of the Internet” have never “been subject
to the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended
the broadcast industry.”253 In light of this medium’s relative freedom
from regulation, he detected no risk that users “might infer some sort of
official or societal approval of” online content.254 He also noted that
“the Internet is not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television. ”255 “Finally,”
Justice Stevens added, “unlike the conditions that prevailed when
Congress first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the
Internet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.”256
In 2000, the Court got a chance to reconcile Reno with Denver and
the Turner cases. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,257
treated restrictions targeting “signal bleed” from imperfectly scrambled
cable cha nnels offering sexually explicit programming as a transparent
instance of content-based regulation: “The speech in question is defined
by its content; and the statute which seeks to restrict it is content
based.”258 Even Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, agreed that “[t]his
case involve[d] the application, not the elucidation, of First Amendment
principles.”259

251. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
252. Id. at 868 (citations omitted) (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 128 (1989)).
253. Id. at 868–69.
254. Id. at 869 n.33.
255. Id. at 869 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)).
256. Id. at 870.
257. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
258. Id. at 811; see also id. at 812 (“This is the essence of content-based regulation.”).
259. Id. at 835 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Playboy did continue the habit of drawing comparisons to
broadcasting: “Cable television, like broadcast media, presents unique
problems, which inform our assessment of the interests at stake, and
which may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable in other
contexts.”260 The Court, however, used “a key difference” between
cable and broadcasting to reinforce rather than dilute strict scrutiny.261
Observing that “[c]able systems have the capacity to block unwanted
channels on a household-by-household basis,” the Court held that
Congress had unconstitutionally favored broad-gauged measures
against signal bleed over the feasible, effective, and less speechrestrictive strategy of “targeted blocking.”262 Technology in private
rather than official hands, the Court concluded, enables “esthetic and
moral judgments about art and literature, [to] be formed, tested, and
expressed. ”263
In two cases styled Ashcroft v. ACLU,264 the Supreme Court
reviewed the statutory successor to the CDA. In response to Reno,
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 (COPA).265
Ashcroft I, decided in 2002, deflected a facial challenge to COPA ’s
overt use of the three-part obscenity test of Miller v. California ,266
particularly that decision’s reliance on “contemporary community
standards” in defining a work’s appeal to the prurient interest.267 The
challengers argued that COPA would subject online work, otherwise
globally available, to the suffocating standards of America’s least
tolerant community.268 A three-Justice plurality led by Justice Thomas
concluded “that COPA ’s reliance on community standards . . . does not

260. 529 U.S. at 813.
261. Id. at 815.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 818.
264. 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (Ashcroft I); 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (Ashcroft II).
265. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)); see
generally H.R. R EP. N O. 105-775, at 5, 12 (1998) (response to Reno); S. R EP. N O. 105-225, at 2
(1998) (same).
266. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
267. Id. at 24.
268. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 573:
Because ‘Web publishers are without any means to limit access to their sites based on
the geographic location of particular Internet users,’ the Court of Appeals reasoned
that COPA would require ‘any material that might be deemed harmful by the most
puritan of communities in any state’ . . . [to] lead inexorably to a holding of a
likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute.
(quoting ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the
First Amendment.”269
Justice Thomas rejected the contention that the Internet’s “‘unique
characteristics’” justify an approach distinct from prevailing doctrine on
obscene and indecent speech.270 Hamling v. United States271 upheld a
federal ban on obscene materials delivered via United States mail. Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC272 upheld a similar federal
statute as applied to obscene telephone calls but invalidated the statute
as applied to indecent, nonobscene communications. Justice Thomas
concluded that Congress could place “‘the burden of complying with
[its] prohibition on obscene messages’” upon a producer of online
speech reaching “different communities with different local
standards.”273
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy again insisted that
the “unique characteristics” and “distinct attributes” of “each mode of
expression” should guide First Amendment analysis.274 In a stark
departure from Turner I, however, Justice Kennedy emphasized factors
beyond physical scarcity. “The economics and the technology of each
medium,” he wrote, “affect both the burden of a speech restriction and
the Government’s interest in maintaining it.”275 Rejecting Justice
Thomas’s reliance on Hamling and Sable, Justice Kennedy stressed that
“[t]he economics and technology of Internet communication differ in
important ways from those of telephones and mail.”276 “Paradoxically,”
he observed, “it is easy and cheap to reach a worldwide audience on the
Internet, but expensive if not impossible to reach a geographic
subset.”277 Unlike mail and telephony, regulating Internet speech
without regard to “national variation in community standards” would
impose an unacceptable burden. 278

269. Id. at 585 (plurality opinion).
270. Id. at 583 (quoting id. at 594–95 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
271. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
272. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
273. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sable Communications of Cal. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1989)).
274. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 594–95 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)).
275. Id. at 595.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
278. Id. at 597.
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Justice O’Connor likewise disputed the plurality’s use of Hamling
and Sable. Concurring in the judgment, she endorsed Justice Kennedy ’s
position that “Internet speakers’ inability to control the geographic
location of their audience” warranted a departure from standards on
mail and phone communications.279 Also concurring in the judgment,
Justice Breyer urged the Court to interpret “the statutory word
‘community’ to refer to the Nation’s adult community taken as a
whole”280 in order to avoid “the serious First Amendment problem that
would otherwise” arise if the statute were construed to “provide the
most puritan of communities with a heckler’s Internet veto affecting the
rest of the Nation.”281
Alone in dissent, Justice Stevens stressed the technological aspects
of the Internet as “a medium in which speech cannot be segregated to
avoid [specific] communities” and in which a speaker, having spoken
“everywhere on the network at once,” can neither “control access based
on the location of the listener, nor . . . choose the [precise] pathways” of
transmission. 282 Justice Stevens argued that the “fundamental difference
in technologies,” which enables a single law effectively to prohibit
transmission of a message to every American with Internet access,
should preclude the analogical use of constitutional “rules applicable to
the mass mailing of an obscene montage or to obscene dial-a-porn.”283
Whether Ashcroft I supports a conduit-specific approach to
Internet speech depends on the tenuous process of deciphering
decisions so “fragmented” that “no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices.”284 What passes as “‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest grounds.’”285 Counting to
five in Ashcroft I yields unsatisfactory results. Justice Thomas’s plurality
of three effectively equated the Internet with the Postal Service and the
public switched telephone network as transmission vectors for sexually
explicit speech. Four of the Justices concurring in the judgment—
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg—did favor a

279. See id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
280. Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
281. Id. at 590 (noting “[t]he technical difficulties associated with efforts to confine Internet
material to particular geographic areas”).
282. Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 606.
284. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
285. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plura lity opinion)).
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conduit-specific approach reminiscent of Red Lion. Justice Breyer,
though sympathetic, adopted a statutory resolution that kept him from
addressing COPA’s constitutionality. Justice Stevens would likewise
have supplied a fifth vote for Justice Kennedy ’s technologically sensitive
methodology, but he stood alone in dissent.
On remand, the lower courts reinstated the preliminary injunction
against COPA.286 In a second case styled Ashcroft v. ACLU,287 the
Supreme Court sustained the injunction. The shift between Ashcroft I
and II from a facial attack to a preliminary injunction markedly favored
COPA’s foes. Characterizing COPA as overtly content-based
regulation, Ashcroft II readily imposed strict scrutiny.288 Because the
government bore “the burden of proof on the ultimate question of
COPA’s constitutionality,” the injunction would stand as long as
COPA’s challengers could establish at least one “plausible, less
restrictive alternative[].”289 Writing for the same coalition of five that
decided Playboy,290 Justice Kennedy concluded that “[b]locking and
filtering software is . . . less restrictive than COPA, and, in addition,
likely more effective as a means of restricting children’s access.”291
Justice Kennedy praised filters for imposing “selective restrictions on
speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.”292
He speculated that filters might be “more effective than COPA,”
insofar as filters operate without regard to geography and cover “all
forms of Internet communication, including e-mail.”293

286. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 266–71 (3d Cir. 2003), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)
(“Because the ACLU will likely succeed on the merits in establishing that COPA is
unconstitutional because it fails strict scrutiny and is overbroa d, we will affirm the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.”).
287. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (Ashcroft II).
288. See id. at 2788 (“[T]he Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.”
(citation omitted)).
289. Id. at 2791–92.
290. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in both Playboy and Ashcroft II; Justices
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in each case.
291. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2792.
292. Id.
293. Id. Justice Stevens’s concurrence succinctly summarized the majority’s case against
COPA:
[E]ncouraging deployment of user-based controls, such as filtering software, would
serve Congress’ interest in protecting minors from sexually explicit Internet materials
as well or better than attempting to regulate the vast content of the World Wide Web
at its source, and at a far less significant cost to First Amendment values.
Id. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy drew an explicit comparison to Playboy. Both
Playboy and Ashcroft II, he wrote, “involved a content-based restriction
designed to protect minors from viewing harmful materials.”294 In each
instance, Congress had to choose “between a blanket speech restriction
and a more specific technological solution that was available to parents
who chose to implement it.”295 The record in Playboy was “silent as to
the comparative effectiveness” of the anti-signal bleed statute and the
alternative of consumer-initiated requests to block specific cable
channels.296 In Ashcroft II, the government likewise “failed to introduce
specific evidence proving that existing technologies,” such as filtering
software, are less effective than COPA.297 In both cases, the availability
of technological alternatives defeated content-based regulation. 298 The
Supreme Court has consistently preferred consumer-level controls, even
if imperfect, over categorical restrictions on speech at its source. For
example, the ratings system mandated by the Telecommunications Act
of 1996299 undermines any comprehensive ban on indecency within any
conduit able to exploit the V-chip.300 Indeed, the development and
diffusion of “[u]ser-control technologies” should have the effect of
invalidating all “intrusive government restrictions.”301
294. 124 S. Ct. at 2793.
295. Id. at 2794.
296. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
297. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2793.
298. Cf., e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–77 (1997) (“[T]he District Court found that
‘[d]espite its limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective
method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other
material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely
available.’” (alteration in original) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996));
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–34 (1989) (“The Court of Appeals,
after careful consideration, agreed that . . . rules [‘involving access codes, scrambling, and credit
card payment’] represented a ‘feasible and effective’ way to serve the Government’s compelling
interest in protecting children.”) (quoting Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555
(2d Cir. 1988)).
299. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2000) (requiring the installation of the V-chip in all new TV sets);
id. § 303(w) (directing the broadcast industry to implement a “voluntary” ratings system);
Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 8232 (1998)
(reporting the implementation of a ratings system).
300. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 756
(1996) (“The provision [requiring segregation and blocking of certain sex-related broadcast
material] before us does not reveal the caution and care that [our] standards . . . impose upon laws
that seek to reconcile the critically important interest in protecting free speech with very important,
or even compelling, interest s that sometimes warrant restrictions.”).
301. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 33, at 1634; see also Yoo, supra note 108, at 305 (“ [A]t
least with respect to television, widescale deployment of the V-chip will render all attempts to
restrict the broa dcast of indecent programming unconstitutional.”). See generally J.M. Balkin,
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Judicial assessments of technology are contestable, to say the least.
In his Ashcroft II dissent, Justice Breyer berated filtering software’s
“serious inadequacies.”302 He preferred COPA over filtering “that
underblocks, imposes a cost upon each family that uses it, fails to screen
outside the home, and lacks precision.”303 In United States v. American
Library Association, Inc.,304 Justice Stevens similarly observed that
software based “on key words and phrases” cannot exclude a precisely
defined category of images.305 In Ashcroft II, however, Justice Stevens
endorsed “filtering software” as a “user-based” alternative to COPA.306
Greater judicial receptiveness to consumer-level technology will yield
further outcomes similar to Playboy and Ashcroft II. In light of the
government’s burden to overcome strict scrutiny of content-based
restrictions, evidentiary deadlock favors the challenger. “The ‘starch’ in
our constitutional standards cannot be sacrificed to accommodate the
enforcement choices of the Government.”307
III. THE IMPLICIT LOGIC OF CONDUIT-BASED REGULATION
Having defined the Supreme Court’s approach to conduit-based
regulation of speech, this Article will now criticize that jurisprudence.
Section A will reexamine Red Lion, which remains the quintessential
statement of this body of law. Contrary to its caricature as the origin of
a senseless “scarcity” rationale, Red Lion in fact articulates almost all of
the rationales invoked in examinations of legislative efforts to structure
a specific conduit. Section B will dissect Red Lion’s three interrelated
rationales: scarcity, enhancement of underrepresented voices, and
overall regulatory context. Section C will examine a factor added by
later decisions: the social meaning that emerges from a conduit’s
pervasiveness.

Comment, Media Filters, the V-Chip and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J.
1131 (1996) (“In the Information Age, the informational filter, not information itself, is king.”);
Matthew L. Spitzer, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of the V-Chip, 15 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 429 (1997) (defending the V-chip scheme).
302. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 2803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
304. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
305. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 221 (2003)) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
306. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
307. Playboy , 529 U.S. at 830 (Thomas, J., concurring); accord Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2794.
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A. Red Lion Reconsidered
“A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost.”308 By this
standard, constitutional law fares poorly. The jurisprudence of conduitbased regulation has not yet transcended its origins in broadcasting.
This entire body of law “ha[s] a musty odor” even though Red Lion, “its
chief source of constitutional authority,” has not yet reached its fortieth
anniversary.309 No one besides the Supreme Court actually believes the
scarcity rationale. Dissatisfaction with Red Lion has spawned an
academic cottage industry.310 Lower courts have urged the Supreme
Court to overrule Red Lion.311 Even the FCC repudiated Red Lion312
(though the Commission later renounced this heretical stance).313 Yet

308. ALFRED N ORTH WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION & OTHER ESSAYS 162 (1929);
cf. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF K NOWLEDGE 199 (1998) (“[P]rogress in a
scientific discipline can be measured by how quickly its founders are forgotten.”).
309. Robinson, supra note 82, at 903–04.
310. Exemplary sources, all of which indict Red Lion’s scarcity rationale to some degree,
include LEE C. BOLLINGER , IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87–90 (1991); LUCAS A. SCOT POWE, JR.,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197–209 (1987); MATTHEW L.
SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 7–18 (1986); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel
L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. R EV. 207, 221–26 (1982);
Hall, supra note 140, at 708–14; Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First
Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. R EV. 905, 908, 926–30 (1997); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. R EV. 20, 49 (1975); Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream,
1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 151–52; Daniel D. Polsby, Candidate Access to the Air: The Uncertain Future
of Broadcaster Discretion, 1981 SUP. CT. R EV. 223, 257–58; Spitzer, supra note 138, at 991; Van
Alstyne, supra note 11, at 574; Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. R EV.
1103, 1106 (1993); Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: Why Can’t Cable Be More
like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. R EV. 212, 221–22 (1987). A decade before Red Lion, Ronald Coase’s
attack on the scarcity rationale, R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 12–1 7 (1959), presaged what eventually would be called the “Coase theorem,” first
propounded in GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 75–80 (1988);
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
311. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724–26 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (arguing that Red Lion should not be extended
even if it cannot simply be pronounced dead); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v.
FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Perhaps the Supreme Court will one day revisit this area
of the law and either eliminate the Red Lion distinction . . . or announce a new distinction that is
more useable than the present one.”).
312. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
313. Compare Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872, 887–88 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (declining to abrogate the personal attack and political editorializing rules at issue in Red
Lion solely on the st rength of the repeal of the fairness doctrine in Syracuse Peace Council), with
Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (issuing a writ of
mandamus ordering the Commission to repeal the personal attack and political editorializing
rules).
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Red Lion still matters because the Supreme Court says it does.314 Lower
courts inclined to declare that Red Lion “no longer makes sense”
acknowledge, as they must, that they are “not in a position to reject the
scarcity rationale.”315 The high court consistently invokes Red Lion
when it dilutes First Amendment review of laws having some
connection to broadcasting.316
Though much of the criticism of Red Lion has focused on the
scarcity rationale, the decision’s treatment of technological innovation
looms much larger. In many settings, technological innovation demands
reinterpretation of the Constitution. Even originalist theories
accommodate “technological changes.”317 Mindful of the government’s
ability to exploit “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching” technologies,318 the
Supreme Court monitors how “the advance of technology” may affect
“the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment.”319 Wary of “leav[ing] the homeowner at the mercy of
advancing technology,” the Court considers not only “relatively crude ”
technology in use, but also “more sophisticated systems . . . in
development.”320
314. The high court, after all, retains “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); accord State Oil Co.
v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality opinion).
315. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that the “abundance
of non-broadcast media does not render the broadcast spectrum any less scarce”).
316. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 370–71, 380 (1984); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775,
795 (1978); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.30 (1978); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983)
(“[T]he specia l interest of the Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not
readily translate into a justification for regulation of other means of communication.”) (footnote
omitted).
317. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory , 47 STAN. L. R EV. 395,
440 (1995) (arguing that no variant of originalism has ever insisted that constitutional cases be
decided as if relevant “changes in . . . technology” had never occurred). But cf. Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (advocating the unhesitating application
of “old values to new circumstances,” ranging from “changes in technology” to “new
understanding[s] of a social situation”).
318. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
319. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
320. Id. at 35–36; cf. Ollma n, 750 F.2d at 1038 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analogizing the
Fourth Amendment’s accommodation of “modern electronic surveillance” to the Commerce
Clause’s accommodation of trucks and the First Amendment’s accommodation of broadcasting).
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Fear of technological erosion of rights should trigger a similar
alarm in free speech jurisprudence. What Chief Justice Warren
observed with respect to “the television camera” applies equally to
Fourth and First Amendment liberties: “technological innovations [are]
not entitled to pervade the lives of everyone in disregard of
constitutionally protected rights.”321 The special status of technological
innovation as “a singularly uncontroversial justification for modifying
established doctrine” warrants heightened vigilance.322 Far from
embracing new channels of expression, lawmakers routinely respond to
unfamiliar technologies by suppressing them. Putative “technologies of
freedom”323 could in fact represent the First Amendment’s “Trojan
horse.”324
Armed with Red Lion’s declaration that “differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them,”325 courts routinely exploit technological
differences between older and newer modes of communication in
calibrating constitutional protection within the newer medium. 326 It is
unclear whether systematic reliance “on reference points provided by
older, established technologies” has advanced the constitutional
understanding of conduit-based regulation.327 A jurisprudential engine
fueled so heavily by “principles operating at a low or intermediate level
of abstraction” is bound to yield “incompletely theorized judgments.”328

See generally Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy, and Thermal Imaging , 86 MINN. L. R EV. 1379 (2002)
(criticizing the overuse of technology-based arguments in contemporary Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity , 82 TEX. L. R EV. 1349
(2004) (questioning why the law should require a search warrant before a traditional search can be
conducted, but not when a search relies upon video surveillance).
321. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 585 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
322. Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence:
Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. R EV. 976, 1008 (1997).
323. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
324. Robinson, supra note 82, at 902.
325. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
326. Cf. Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. R EV. 1062, 1062 (1994) (“Courts often succumb to the temptation to
analogize new ele ctronic media to existing technologies for which they have already developed
First Amendment models.”).
327. Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to Technological Change
and Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 BROOK. L. R EV. 361, 372–73 (2000).
328. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning , 106 HARV. L. R EV. 741, 746 (1993) (emphasis
omitted); cf. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. R EV. 923, 964 (1996) (“[A]rgument by analogy works

012306 02_CHEN.D O C

1406

2/6/2006 10:18 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1359

Worse still, these controversies’ factual records rarely “reflect current
technological reality—a serious flaw in any case involving the Internet”
or any other emerging technology.329
Nor is there anything doctrinally neutral about the exercise of
paying obligatory homage to Red Lion. Given the doctrinal baseline for
content-based regulation—strict scrutiny absent affirmative debasement
of the speech at issue —Red Lion’s invitation to examine “the
characteristics of new media” represents a one-way, downward
ratchet.330 As Red Lion itself illustrated, invoking a conduit-specific
approach to the First Amendment tends, perhaps inexorably, to
degrade constitutional protection for speech. Throughout the logical
layer of free speech jurisprudence, judicial consideration of a conduit’s
traits rarely if ever enhances constitutional protection. In United States
v. American Library Association, Inc.,331 for instance, parties challenged
the Children’s Internet Protection Act’s requirement that libraries
install filtering software on Internet access terminals as a condition of
federal funding.332 A plurality of Justices rejected the argument that
Internet access converts a public library into “a ‘designated public
forum’” enjoying heightened protection against governmental
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech.333 According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a library “provides Internet access, not to
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’ but . . . to
facilitate research, learning and recreational pursuits by furnishing
materials of requisite and appropriate quality.”334 The Chief Justice
echoed the Senate’s sentiment that the Internet was nothing “‘more
than a technological extension of the book stack. ’”335
by comparing two items and by inferring from the fact that these items share some properties that
they share some further property.”).
329. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004). See generally Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process,
78 TEX. L. R EV. 269, 290–96 (1999) (describing the perils of reviewing statutes such as COPA and
the CDA on the basis of a technologically volatile appellate record).
330. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386. But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)
(discussing the inability of statutes to dilute equal protection and due process rights).
331. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
332. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000); Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
333. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
334. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834
(1995)).
335. Id. at 207 (quoting S. R EP. N O. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
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An accurate assessment of the free speech jurisprudence of
conduit-based regulation begins with a proper refutation of Red Lion’s
mythically implausible scarcity rationale. The opinion’s concluding
paragraph and footnote identify three interrelated rationales. In
addition to “the scarcity of broadcast frequencies,” the Court cited two
distinct factors counseling judicial acquiescence in the regulation of
broadcasting: “the Government’s role in allocating those frequencies,
and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental
assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their
views.”336 Red Lion also presented two intriguing “related argument[s]”
beyond the admittedly temporary “technological scarcity of
frequencies.”337 First, the Court acknowledged that legally induced
“economic scarcity” arising from actual or potential “limit[s] [on] entry
to the broadcasting market” might justify “the fairness doctrine or its
equivalent” on behalf “of those excluded” from the airwaves.338 Other
passages plainly reveal the Court’s awareness that scarcity in
broadcasting was a technologically volatile phenomenon. Red Lion took
pains to confine its holding to the state of communications technology
as of 1969.339 Second, the Court hinted that it might uphold “legislation
[that] directly or indirectly multipl[ies] the voices and views presented to
the public through . . . devices which limit or dissipate the power of
those who sit astride the channels of communication with the general
public.”340
Careful exegesis of Red Lion therefore reveals no fewer than three
distinct justifications for tailoring First Amendment protection by
conduit. First, a nuanced understanding of scarcity and its technological
context might justify governmental intervention. Second, the history
and thoroughness of regulation may warrant greater deference to the
legislative structuring of a conduit. Third, a conduit’s vulnerability to
monopolization may merit official efforts to mute louder voices so that
softer ones might be heard. Cases after Red Lion supplied a fourth
rationale: some media are “uniquely pervasive,” able without warning
336. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
337. Id. at 401 n.28.
338. Id.
339. See id. at 396–97 (“Advances in technology, such as microwave transmission, have led to
more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spectrum have also grown
apace.”); id. at 399 (“The rapidity with which technological advances succeed one another to create
more efficient use of spectrum space . . . makes it unwise to speculate on [its] future
allocation . . . .”). See generally supra text accompanying notes 157–62.
340. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 401 n.28.
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to shatter privacy even at home, and “uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read.”341 The leading authority for the
pervasiveness rationale, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,342 upheld the
FCC’s power over the timing of potentially offensive broadcasts such as
George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” routine without relying “on the notion
of ‘spectrum scarcity.’”343
Red Lion, as it turns out, came dangerously close to articulating a
comprehensive (if not altogether coherent or credible) theory on
conduit-based regulation of speech. Aside from an inchoate expression
of enhancement theory and a failure to anticipate pervasiveness, its
justifications conform quite closely to the multifaceted approach that
the Supreme Court would eventually summarize in 1997: “the history of
extensive Government regulation,” “the scarcity of available” avenues
for expression, and the contested medium’s “‘invasive’ nature.”344 The
First Amendment jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation therefore
hinges on four interrelated rationales: scarcity, regulatory context,
enhancement, and pervasiveness. The remaining sections of Part III will
assess these rationales in turn. Section B will address scarcity,
regulation, and enhancement as interrelated phenomena. Section C will
examine pervasiveness.
B. Enhancing the Legal Understanding of Rivalrousness and
Regulation
1. Enhancement theory. Among the rationales marshaled in
defense of conduit-based regulation, the so-called “enhancement
theory” is the easiest to dismiss. First Amendment jurisprudence has
struggled mightily with the urge to enhance the voices of the “many
people who have ideas . . . but who do not have enough money to own
or control publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture
studios, or chains of show places.”345 Congressman Charles E. Bennett
341. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978); accord Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
866 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744
(1996) (plurality opinion); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989).
342. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
343. Id. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L.
Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51
FORDHAM L. R EV. 606, 621 (1983) (noting that scarcity justifies “diversity” in the sense of “offbeat
or unusual . . . programming” rather than censorship).
344. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
345. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
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argued in 1949 that the antitrust laws were “one of the greatest
bulwarks against Communism” because they protected ordinary
Americans “from domination by business interests so large and
monopolistic that the voices of average people cannot be heard in
their thunder.”346 Some analysts today advocate overtly content-based
regulation, arguing that the failure to engage an imperfect
“marketplace of ideas” favors the privileged. 347 These critics fear that
deregulation of access to the most lucrative conduits—whether
through a retreat from the regulatory status quo or by vigorous First
Amendment review—could winnow “the field of otherwise eligible
applicants strictly according to their ability to pay” and eliminate
“those who lack dollars to put in an effective bid.”348
Enhancement theory assumes that an unregulated speech market
will fall victim to “biases that skew, distort, and corrupt” public
discourse.349 Regulating speech in the public sphere, from this
perspective, is no less objectionable or necessary than applying the law
of evidence in criminal cases.350 Wealth may be the most dreaded
influence: accelerating “the age-old human drive for self-gratification”
through “exploitation of highly advanced electronic technology”
allegedly “trivialize[s] public expression and . . . undermine[s] the
traditional aims of the First Amendment.”351 From this perspective, “the
right prize” at stake in making “regulatory choices” for “the Internet
and the dig itally networked environment” is “not the Great Shopping

346. 95 CONG. R EC. 11,506 (1949) (statement of Rep. Bennett), quoted in Herbert
Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 1, 25 (1982).
347. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 49–50, 57–58
(1993); see, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1,
5 (arguing that “real world conditions,” such as expensive access costs and control of the media by
the elite, “interfere with the effective operation of the marketplace of ideas”); cf. Eugene Volokh,
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806 (1995) (conceding that it is “easier
for the rich to speak than it is for the poor,” but advocating market-based responses to the
disparity in favor of solutions smacking of command-and-control regulation).
348. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 562; e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, R EPUBLIC.COM (2001);
Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of
Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1273 (1983); Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. R EV. 813; Weinberg, supra note 310, at 1193–203.
349. BOLLINGER, supra note 310, at 139.
350. Id. at 140; see Geoffrey R. Stone, Imagining a Free Press, 90 MICH. L. R EV. 1246, 1262
(1992) (asserting that society has the right to limit the press’s reporting of “information [that] has a
greater potential to distract and distort than to inform our better judgment,” similar to its right to
make prejudicial evidence inadmissible).
351. R ONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 3–4 (1996).
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Mall in Cybe rspace,” but rather “the Great Agora—the unmediated
conversation of the many with the many.”352
No matter how badly scholars want enhancement, though, courts
disagree.353 Most free speech cases spurn “the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others.”354 Favoring one speaker over
another is “wildly at odds with the normal First Amendment belief that
more speech is better.”355 The instinctive rejection of the enhancement
theory grows from the suspicion that “government intervention is as
likely to suppress diversity as to promote it.”356
One of the exceptional areas of First Amendment jurisprudence
that does accommodate the enhancement theory is conduit-based
regulation. The Supreme Court’s frequent observation that “the
broadcast media pose unique and special problems not present in the
traditional free speech case”357 allows the enhancement theory to
flourish within broadcast regulation. The limited nature of spectrum
putatively justifies an aggressive federal role in “secur[ing] a reasonable
equality of opportunity in radio.”358 In the clearest endorsement of
enhancement theory, NCCB declared that “‘“efforts to enhance the
volume and quality of coverage” of public issues’ through regulation of
broadcasting may be permissible where similar efforts to regulate the

352. Benkler, supra note 17, at 565. Professor Benkler’s attempt to distinguish “the Great
Shopping Mall in Cyberspace” from “the Great Agora” is ironic. The Greek agora was an open
marketplace and is thus a forerunner of today’s shopping malls.
353. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (noting that a law may be
unconst itutional even if “supported by all the law professors in the land”).
354. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam); accord Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
414, 426 n.7 (1988); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 n.4
(1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–91 (1978).
355. L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. R EV. 243,
269; cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (“[T]he
First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all.”);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
356. David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the “New Media”—New Directions in
Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 212 (1979).
357. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); accord Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49
n.55.
358. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933).
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print media would not be.”359 This dictum has never proved dispositive
in any subsequent Supreme Court case; as with the scarcity rationale,
broadcasting law’s exceptional treatment of the enhancement theory
has never dictated the resolution of other conduit-based disputes. As
Part IV.A shows, lower court decisions involving structural regulation
of communications have consistently confined NCCB to broadcasting.
Cases involving must-carry obligations and ownership restrictions in
nonbroadcast media have applied a tougher brand of scrutiny. NCCB
therefore provides no firm support for the proposition that
enhancement theory pervades the jurisprudence of conduit-based
regulation. Confining this deviant theory to a single, historically
circumscribed setting merely isolates the law of broadcasting as an
aberrant branch of First Amendment jurisprudence.
Rejecting enhancement theory does not resolve the yearning for
greater competition in the marketplace of ideas. The “great fear” that
motivates the jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation is “a fear not of
one but of many.”360 This body of law embodies a concern that
uncoordinated speech markets would drown in a “cacophony of
competing voices, none of which [can] be clearly and predictably
heard.”361 The challenge lies in reconciling this anxiety with the
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”362 with “the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public.”363

359. FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 (1978) (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 50–51 n.55 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969))).
360. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 19 (1935).
361. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376; accord Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530,
542 (1980); see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943) (describing the early experience
with unregulated radio as “confusion and chaos”).
362. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also FCC v. League of Wome n
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (describing the First Amendment as designed “‘to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas’” and “‘the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas’” (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390)); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (noting the First Amendment interest in the freedom of
listeners to “receive information and ideas”).
363. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); accord, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 785 (1978); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
139–40 (1969). See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN , FREE SPEECH AND ITS R ELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2001) (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. R EV. 245.
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Enhancement theory’s putative justification, scarcity, simply does
not distinguish broadcasting from any other conduit. First Amendment
doctrine presumptively rejects enhancement as antithetical to selfgovernance through the free flow of ideas. That presumption has
historically been reversed, or at least suspended, in the context of
broadcasting facilities whose peculiar scarcity supposedly warrants a
deviant approach. If the scarcity rationale collapses, either with respect
to broadcasting or across a diverse range of conduits, its fall similarly
dooms enhancement theory.
2. Scarcity as rivalrousness and the government’s regulatory
response. The contradictions of enhancement theory therefore demand
a more careful definition of “scarcity.” Scarcity in the sense of
rivalrousness is not equivalent to the economic definition of scarcity as a
constraint on consumer choice. The latter notion of scarcity, as “a
universal fact, . . . can hardly explain regulation in one context and not
another,” let alone “justif[y] content regulation of broadcasting in a way
that would be intolerable if applied to . . . the print media.”364 Because
“[a]ll economic goods are scarce,” not “everyone who wishes to publish
a newspaper . . . may do so.”365 Invoking scarcity in this sense represents
at best an exercise in spurious market definition. Not only is scarcity
universal; it is marvelously contingent and elastic. Any technolog ically
driven expansion in available channels of communication can defeat a
claim of scarcity. Absent a convincing demonstration of “physical
interference,” the government lacks “an essential precondition” that
might otherwise justify “an umpiring role.”366
Clarifying the scarcity rationale begins with a careful distinction
between rivalrous and nonrivalrous resources.367 In stark contrast with
the rivalrous nature of most tangible goods, whereby gainful use by one
party leads directly to another party’s loss, use of a nonrivalrous good
“by one entity does not necessarily diminish the use and enjoyment of

364. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(arguing that “analytical confusion” necessarily arises from any “attempt to use a universal fact as
a distinguishing principle”); accord Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Action for Children’s Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (e n banc) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
365. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 508.
366. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (emphasis
added).
367. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS : THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 21 (2001).

012306 02_CHEN.D O C

2005]

2/6/2006 10:18 AM

CONDUIT-BASED REGULATION

1413

others.”368 Although ideas are as “free as the air to common use,”369 the
frequencies on which ideas may be transmitted are not free from
physical conflict. “[E]very transmitter creates some interference”:
whenever a consumer “uses a cordless telephone, or even turns on a
light,” the resulting emission of energy creates some “interference for
nearby users of nearby frequencies.”370 Because simultaneous use of
spectrum is inescapably rivalrous, “organizing that resource within a
system of control makes good sense.”371 Within broadcasting, that
system consists of a “regulatory mechanism to divide the
electromagnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular
broadcasters.”372
The constitutional significance of the “limited” availability of
“radio facilities” cannot be distinguished from the regulatory interest in
preventing “the confusion that would result from interferences” among
competing uses of spectrum.373 What the jurisprudence of conduit-based
regulation has called scarcity is better understood as rivalrousness,
which justifies governmental efforts to dismantle barriers to competition
and freedom of movement within the marketplace of ideas. So
rehabilitated, the scarcity rationale even restores a hint of enhancement
theory: “The logic of the scarcity rationale is that there are not enough
opportunities for speakers to express themselves, and that the
government has a role to play in ensuring that these limited
opportunities be put to the most valuable uses for society.”374 If nothing
else, broadcast licensing’s awareness of rivalrousness boasts a long legal
pedigree. The Supreme Court has characterized any “attempt by a
broadcaster to use a given frequency in disregard of its prior use by

368. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1369 (11th Cir. 2002).
369. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
370. Benjamin, supra note 84, at 11 (emphasis added). See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin,
Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 2007,
2021–24 (2003) (addressing “the importance of interference” and the “tragedy of the commons”
that occurs “if constraints are not placed on communications”).
371. LESSIG, supra note 367, at 115.
372. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994); cf. Brief for
Appellant NBC at 31, NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (Nos. 554, 555) (observing that no
broadcaster has ever contested “the sheer physical necessity of preventing destructive electrical
interference between stations”).
373. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933).
374. Benjamin, supra note 84, at 44; cf. Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children:
Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 23, 41–57 (2001) (arguing that decisions to
exclude noninterfering users from the radio spectrum should be subject to withering First
Amendment scrutiny).
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others, thus creating confusion and interference,” as a dastardly act that
“deprives the public of the full benefit of radio audition.”375 Broadcast
“pirates” enjoy no meaningful right to free speech.376
Indeed, rivalrousness effectively defines the law of broadcast
licensing. The Ashbacker right to comparative licensing proceedings
eases a conflict created by the law itself:377 the decision to award any
license precludes another broadcaster from using the same frequency in
the same locality.378 Although alternatives to licensing, such as
auctions 379 or common law resolution of claims by “spectrum
squatters,”380 would offer different solutions to rivalrousness, they could
never cure the mutual exclusivity of competing uses. Conducting an

375. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
376. See Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding an FCC regulation
banning broadcast pirates from obtaining a low-power FM radio license despite the petitioner’s
First Amendment challenge); cf. United States v. Szoka, 260 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here
is no constitutional right to broadcast without a license.”).
377. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945) (holding “that where two
bona fide applications are mutually exclusive,” the FCC must conduct hearings to avoid depriving
either party of “the opportunity which Congress chose to give him”). But cf. Fed. Radio Comm’n v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (entitling an applicant who met the
statutory requirements of the Radio Act of 1927 to be licensed even if the Federal Radio
Commission had neither heard nor considered later applications).
378. See Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 330, 332–33; cf. FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 239, 243–44, 247 (1943)
(granting an incumbent licensee the right to intervene in another licensee’s application to increase
its transmission power and expand its hours of operation if such regulatory changes would cause
“electrical interference”).
379. See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: The Birth and
Stillbirth of DTV Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 518 (1997) (discussing controversies over
the FCC’s use of auctions to allocate spectrum); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S.
Regulation of the Broa dcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 171–72 (1990) (discussing how the
“early history of broadcasting” prevented frequencies from being auctioned to “the highest
bidder”); Eli Noam, Spectrum Auction: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s
Anachronism—Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 778–80 (1998)
(discussing a theoretical auction format using access code “tokens”); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo
Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON R EG.
53, 69 (1999) (assessing the value of a “right-of-use doctrine” over “traditional licensing regimes”);
Richard W. Stevens, Anarchy in the Skip Zone: A Proposal for Market Allocation of High
Frequency Spectrum, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 43 (188) (proposing a market allocation system in
which “primary” users can sell or lease a subset of their spectrum rights).
380. See PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND
LET COMMON LAW R ULE THE TELECOSM 74–76 (1997); Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in
Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. R EV. 1746, 1764–67 (1999) (book review) (criticizing Huber’s “rush to
paint the spectrum in the image of real property” and advocating the use of trademark law as “a
model for defining a common law right to use the spectrum”); Hazlett, supra note 379, at 148–52
(describing the resolution of “the classic interference problem” through the application of the
common law’s “homesteading principle”).
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auction, as the law now often demands,381 would still require the FCC to
set power limits and frequency ranges, which in turn would affect the
number of licenses and their uses. Reliance on the common law would
require nonexpert, generalist courts to perform the same task, ex post
rather than ex ante. This choice between a liability rule and a property
rule, though justifiable on other economic grounds,382 does not settle or
eliminate rivalrousness. The heated debate over licensing and its
alternatives thus hinges solely on a question of remedies, even as
underlying conflicts among uses of spectrum remain unresolved.
Licensing as a remedy does carry constitutional consequences.
Approval of broadcast licensing represents a significant departure from
the Supreme Court’s deep and historically validated suspicion of
licensing as the quintessential prior restraint.383 “The struggle for the
freedom of the press was pr imarily directed against the power of the
licensor.”384 Early in constitutional history, “a law requiring the licensing
of printers” was recognized as the “archetypical censorship statute.”385
The sixteenth and seventeenth century “licensing laws” that the Bill of
Rights targeted as a “core abuse” have a contemporary analogue in
broadcast licensing.386 Even when courts allow licensing schemes, they
impose stringent conditions,387 lest the unscrupulous licensor achieve
censorial objectives through “post hoc rationalizations” and “shifting or
illegitimate criteria.”388 In another instance in which “equal protection”
considerations are “closely intertwined” with free speech,389 constraints
on licensing consider the “specific sequence of events leading up to the
381. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i), (j) (2000).
382. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV . L. R EV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972).
383. Yoo, supra note 108, at 255–56.
384. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938); see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (describing early efforts to curb “the legislative power of the licenser
resulting in renunciation of the censorship of the press”).
385. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988).
386. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002).
387. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225–26 (1990) (allowing petitioners
to challenge a city’s “‘general’ inspection scheme” on First Amendment grounds), overruled in part
by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L. C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004); City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at
757–58 (advocating standards to ensure that the “difficulties of proof and the case-by-case nature
of ‘as applied’ cha llenges” do not allow licensors to exercise unfettered discretion); Riley v. Nat’l
Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988).
388. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758.
389. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Karst, supra note 310, at 21 (“The
principle of equality . . . is not just a peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but [is] part
of the ‘central meaning of the First Amendment.’”).
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challenged decision,” especially departures from procedural or
substantive norms.390
Not even extensive tailoring, however, can excuse most licensing
schemes. “It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but
the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the
danger to freedom of discussion.”391 In speech as in other endeavors,
“[t]he main value of the sword of Damocles is that it hangs, not that it
drops.”392 “Measured against [the] criteria” prescribed for prior
restraints, “the broadcasting regime clearly fails.”393
Moreover, the longstanding practice of using comparative licensing
to resolve spectrum conflicts effectively merges the scarcity rationale
with solicitude for regulatory schemes. The Supreme Court “has
recognized the strong governmental interest in certain forms of
economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an
incidental effect on rights of speech and association.”394 Although
broadcasters have been regulated on terms distinct from those imposed
on common carriers,395 what matters is that the government does restrict
entry into and exit from these industries, and does so tightly. Though
neither “owned by the federal government” nor subjected by it to rate
regulation, “spectrum is subject to strict governmental regulation. ”396
Regulation of entry, even if not of rates, gives the government freer rein
over an entire conduit.397 The Court has distinguished laws targeting
390. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
391. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); see also id. (“The power of the licensor . . . is
pernicious not merely by reason of the censure of particular comments but by reason of the threat
to censure comments on matters of public concern.”).
392. Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 605 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Lou Cannon, Nixon Aide Explains
TV License Challenges, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1973, at A17); accord Yoo, supra note 108, at 258.
393. Yoo, supra note 108, at 256.
394. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982); accord Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring); FTC v. Supe rior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 428 n.12 (1990).
395. See United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 348–49 & n.17 (1959) (excluding broa dcasters
from “the extensive controls, including rate regulation, of Title II of the Communications Act”);
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940) (“In contradistinction to
communication by telephone and telegraph, which the Communications Act recognizes as a
common carrier activity and regulates accordingly in analogy to the regulation of rail[roads] . . . ,
the Act recognizes that broadcasters are not common carriers and are not to be dealt with as
such.”).
396. In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 1999).
397. Cf. Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. R EV. 1687, 1691, 1725 (1997) (arguing that
the historic pra ctice of giving licenses to broadcasters warrants giving the government a wide
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“the structure of market” from laws “regulat[ing] the content of
speech.”398 To the extent that they can be characterized as structural
rather than content-based, conduit-based regulations escape searching
scrutiny. Just as neither half of “the Commerce Clause protects the
particular structure or methods of operation in a . . . market,”399 the
Supreme Court “see[s] nothing in the First Amendment to prevent”
measures that “promote the ‘public interest’ in diversification of the
mass communications media.”400
Accommodation of existing regulation gives wide berth to
broadcast licensing and kindred schemes for structuring
communications markets. In many other settings, the grant of a license
may injure other competitors but does not perforce exclude them from
the market. In those circumstances, regulation creates no entitlement to
a comparative hearing.401 Regulatory law distinguishes between
programs that confer licenses on all “fit, willing, and able ” applicants402
and schemes such as broadcast licensing or cable franchising, which
constitutional berth). Other sources endorsing this “quid pro quo” justification include Reed
Hundt & Karen Kornbluth, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring
Clear Rules for Children’s Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11, 17 (1996), and
Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66 GEO. WASH. L. R EV.
686, 687–90 (1998).
398. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the Court’s “task
would [have been] quite different” had the statute targeted content rather than market conduits);
see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 669 n.2 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[F]actual findings accompanying economic
measures . . . merit greater deference than those supporting content-based restrictions on
speech.”).
399. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978); accord CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93–94 (1987).
400. FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); see also Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (“[T]o deny a station license because ‘the public
interest’ requires it ‘is not a denial of free speech.’” (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
227 (1943))).
401. Compare Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(sustaining a federal savings and loan charter granted without a comparative hearing, on the
reasoning that such a charter did not exclude the competitor from the home lending business), with
Pa. R.R. Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 294–97 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (using similar reasoning in railroad
regulation).
402. Cf., e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10922(a)(1)–(2) (1994) (requiring the ICC to issue a certificate to a
motor carrier if it finds that the carrier is “fit, willing, and able” to perform transportation services
“required by the present or future public convenience and necessity”) repealed by ICC
Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 102(a), 109 Stat. 803, 804; Schaffer Transp. Co. v.
United States, 355 U.S. 83, 85 n.1 (1957) (noting that an applicant for additional authority under
section 207(a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 must be “fit, willing, and able” to provide the
service that it proposes). See generally William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870–1920, 79 COLUM. L. R EV. 426 (1979).
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follow the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard
articulated in statutes such as the Communications Act of 1934.403
Although licensing presumes that “the broadcasting field is open to
anyone” who “shows his competency, the adequacy of his equipment,
and financial ability to make good use of [an] assigned channel,” this
nominally open opportunity is constrained by a crucial contingency.404
There must “be an available frequency over which” the would-be
entrant “can broadcast without interference to others.”405 What
broadcasting law calls scarcity is merely the recognition that every
license precludes all other contemporaneous uses of spectrum. Cable
franchising likewise guarantees that a single operator will serve a
particular locality. Physical restraints do govern both settings—as
spectrum limits the number and strength of distinct signals, so will cable
operators encounter some limit on the ir ability to lay wire. In both
settings, however, the more important constraint is legal rather than
physical.
To repeat: scarcity as rivalrousness is not equivalent to the
economic definition of scarcity as a constraint on consumption. Before
Ashbacker, the Supreme Court held that “economic injury to an existing
station is not a separate and independent” consideration in broadcast
licensing.406 It takes but a small sleight of hand, though, to transform
injury to rival broadcasters into a relevant element of the public interest:
“economic injury to an existing station, while not in and of itself a
matter of moment, becomes important when on the facts it spells
diminution or destruction of service.”407
If anything, treating scarcity as synonymous with economic injury
yields perverse broadcasting policy. Incumbent protection, once
anathema in broa dcast regulation, has become the raison d’être of
licensing in the public interest. Incumbent licensees eventually secured a
presumption favoring renewal,408 ultimately codified in 1996.409

403. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
404. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 476; accord Southeastern Enterprises, 22 F.C.C. 605, 610–12 (1957); see also H.R.
R EP. N O. 85-1297, at 64–99 (1957) (discussing the consideration of competitive factors in broadcast
regulation).
407. Carroll Broad. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
408. Cent. Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1084 (1983). For a thumbnail history of this policy, see FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for
Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 782–83 & n.5, 805–07 (1978).
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“[P]reserving the effective over-air use of the radio spectrum had been
the basis of regulatory policy, but once the policy was established it
became an end in itself, to be preserved even against a new medium
that eliminated the need for the policy in the first place.”410 Like holders
of taxicab medallions,411 incumbent broadcasters seek to limit the
number of licenses.412 They usually succeed. Efforts by the broadcasting
industry to protect its interests at cable ’s expense demonstrate that
“[n]ew regulations, ostensibly defended as public -interested or as
helping viewers and consumers, will often be a product of private selfinterest, and not good for the public at all.”413 What is bad for broadcast
is good for America.
3. Divergent regulatory approaches to different communications
conduits. The communications industry reflects many of the traits that
justify regulation of other failed or flawed markets. In media markets,
speakers deviate substantially from the romantic, “Luke Skywalker”
vision of speakers as boardwalk painters, soapbox orators, and subway
guitarists. “Speakers are not numerous, nor are they fungible.”414
Regulating communicative conduits in pursuit of perfect competition—
a model based on numerous small firms freely entering and exiting a
market for fungible goods and competing solely on the basis of

409. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 204(a), 110 Stat. 56, 112–13. See
generally Lili Levi, Not with a Bang But a Whimper: Broadcast License Renewal and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. R EV. 243, 247 (1996) (arguing that “considerations
of policy and freedom of speech substantively support” the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
410. Robinson, supra note 82, at 904–05.
411. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. R EV. 657, 710–
11 & n.159 (2001) (describing the regulation of taxicabs as “[t]he best analogy to the likely
outcome of a regime with substantial numbers of false convictions”); Robert M. Hardaway, Taxi
and Limousines: The Last Bastion of Economic Regulation, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 319,
367 (2000) (explaining how a medallion system for licensing New York City’s taxis and limousines
harms the average driver and the public while benefiting investors); see also Michael E. Beesley,
Regulation of Taxis, 83 ECON. J. 150, 151 n.2 (1973) (observing that the “taxi industry” absent
regulation “would approximate the characteristics of pe rfect competition”).
412. See, e.g., Charles D. Ferris & Te rence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears: Broadcast
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH. U. L. R EV. 299, 322–23 (1989) (“[It] serves
the interest of those who have gained access to a frequency to restrict as much as possible its
availability to potential competing users.”).
413. Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1767–68
(1995).
414. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media,
and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. R EV. 141, 174 (1995).
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price415 —is neither possible nor desirable. Substantial economies of
scale preclude a communications market of atomistic, independent
actors. Because an “industry with a larger number of owners may well
be less efficient than a more concentrated industry,” contrary efforts to
structure communications markets may sacrifice “[b]oth consumer
satisfaction and potential operating cost savings.”416 Competition among
communicative conduits thus presents yet another instance in which
competition among the few provides “a standard of structure and
performance that is more pertinent than pure competition given the
character of modern technology,” a regulatory norm superior to perfect
competition.417 In this setting as elsewhere, “perfect competition is not
only impossible but inferior.”418
Competition within and among conduits often lacks two of the
conditions of perfect competition: an atomistic market and the absence
of legal restraints on entry and exit. The former condition is static and
structural; the latter, dynamic and legally contingent. The dynamic
factor carries greater constitutional significance. Economies of scale and
network effects constrain the number of competitors within any media
market.419 Traditional newspapers, which often enjoy geographic
monopolies,420 merit full First Amendment protection.421 Fear of media

415. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID R OSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 9–12 (3d ed. 1990) (defining perfect competition as demanding a homogeneous
product, a small number of sellers and buyers relative to the size of the market, no barriers to
entry, and the mobility of resources).
416. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
417. Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable
Markets, 1 YALE J. ON R EG. 111, 119 (1984); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR &
R OBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
(1982); Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71
AM. ECON. R EV. 178, 178 (1981) (advocating policies that “permit[] toleration of factors that make
for na tural monopoly while . . . lesse ning the need for public intervention”); Elizabeth E. Bailey &
John C. Panzar, The Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 125 (1981) (arguing that “contestable markets, even if actually
served by only one firm, [may] exhibit many of the desirable properties of competitive markets”).
418. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (1942).
419. On network effects, formally defined as changes in one consumer’s benefit when others
consume the same good or service, see generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 208–12 (1994) (discussing “collective action problems” such as “excess momentum” and
“excess inertia” created by network externalities); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. R EV. 479 (1998) (addressing “the role of
network economic theory in the legal enterprise”).
420. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (observing that “the number of broadcast stations . . . rivals and perhaps surpasses the
number of newspapers and magazines” (quoting Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir.
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domination is not limited to the electronic domain; the triumph not only
of radio over “the soap box” but also of “the monopoly newspaper”
over “the political pamphlet” animates the fear that “comparatively few
private hands are in a position to determine not only the content of
information but its very availability.”422 Monopolistic market structure
cannot distinguish print from broadcast media. The sharp constitutional
divide between these two industries hinges on some other factor.
What separates print journalism from broadcasting is that
newspaper monopolies are not the products of comprehensive,
conscious regulatory policy. Nor could they be, given the constitutional
tradition opposing the licensure and regulation of print journalists.
Though newspapers and broadcasters may be equally capable of
squelching public debate,423 print and broadcast journalists are different
if only because the law says they are. The mere presence of commandand-control regulation, to say nothing of discretionary choices in its
implementation, plainly restricts freedom of movement into, within, or
out of any market. If only by historical accident, print journalists have
been spared the chore of complying with official constraints on their
economic decisions. Ever since the government intervened in radio,
broadcasters have not enjoyed comparable freedom.
The substantive content of regulatory law is not the sole source of
constitutional distortion. The very presence of an agency and its
accompanying regulatory apparatus reduces a reviewing court’s
marginal propensity to pr otect speech.424 In his Ashcroft I dissent,
Justice Stevens characterized his earlier opinion in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation425 as influenced not only “by the distinctive characteristics
of the broadcast medium” but also by faith in “the expertise of the

1983))); Eli M. Noam & Robert N. Freeman, The Media Monopoly and Other Myths, 29
TELEVISION Q. 18, 22 (1997) (reporting that more than 98% of American cities have only one
daily newspaper); cf. Powe, supra note 186, at 55–56 (observing, more than a quarter-century ago,
that radio and television stations outnumbered daily newspapers).
421. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 253–58 (1974).
422. Jerome Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. R EV.
1641, 1643 (1967).
423. See OWEN M. FISS , LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES
OF STATE P OWER 154–55 (1996) (noting that newspapers, television stations, and radio stations all
compete in a market that “is not neutral as to consent”); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV.
L. R EV. 781, 787–90 (1987) (arguing that the mass-media market is “far from perfect” and
“constrains the presentation of matters of public interest”).
424. Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA . L. R EV. 1, 16–34 (2000).
425. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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agency.”426 Greater deference to an agency reduces the legal space in
which private parties can assert constitutional claims. Courts have
historically regarded communications law as a “supple instrument for
the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has
charged to carry out its legislative policy.”427 Consistent with the
practice of “substantial judicial deference” to administrative
“judgment[s] regarding how the public interest is best served,”428 First
Amendment scrutiny reaches its nadir when lawmakers structure
“industr[ies] so regulated and so largely closed” that competition is
presumptively disfavored.429
Broadcasting meets this definition of an intrinsically flawed
industry. In passing the Radio Act of 1927430 and the Communications
Act of 1934,431 “Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear
that in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field. ”432
Multichannel video programming delivery, by cable or satellite, likewise
qualifies by statute and constitutional tradition as an industry cloaked
with a public interest.433 Federal law authorizes states to franchise cable
operators, tax their revenues, and set their rates.434 Once a cable system
has selected its programming, that “system functions, in essence, as a

426. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 603–04 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
427. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); accord MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 245 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
428. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981); see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (“[A] forecast of the direction in which future public
interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency” (quoting
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961))).
429. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 97 (1953); accord, e.g., Hawaiian Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
430. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, amended by 46 Stat. 844 (1930); cf. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 274–87 (1933) (discussing the Radio Commission’s
authority). See generally Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 466–67 (1930)
(describing the purpose and the content of the Radio Act of 1927); Jora Minasian, The Political
Economy of Broadcasting in the 1920s, 12 J.L. & ECON. 391 (1969) (addressing “the economic
implications of the laws and regulations” made during the period of “cut throat competition” and
chaos before the passage of the Radio Act of 1927).
431. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
432. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 137; accord, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219
(1943).
433. See generally Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (upholding the power to regulate
industries “clothed with a public interest”).
434. 47 U.S.C. §§ 541–547 (2000); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S.
622, 655 (1994) (noting “cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals”).
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conduit for the speech of others.”435 “Satellite carriers [also] function
primarily as conduits for the speech of others.”436 The statutory pledge
that a cable operator shall not be regulated as a common carrier437 sheds
little to no light on First Amendment questions in that industry.438
“[R]adio broadcasting” has long enjoyed an identical promise that its
licensees “shall not . . . be deemed . . . common carrier[s].”439 Neither
this guarantee nor the ban on censorship of broadcast content440 has
enhanced rather than reduced broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.
Whether a conduit fits this “public interest” model is more a
question of legal discretion than of natural definition. Broadcasting fell
under public control not because the physics of spectrum demanded it,
but rather because the government so decreed. One technological
successor to VHF television, direct broadcast satellite (DBS), vividly
depicts how conscious policy and path-dependent circumstance can
override the physical characteristics of a conduit. The first judicial
opinion to examine DBS equated this novel conduit with broadcasting.
In the 1996 case of Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC,441 the D.C.
Circuit dutifully assumed that DBS was subject to “inherent physical
limitation[s]”442 that enable “only a tiny fraction of those with resources
and intelligence” to exploit that medium. 443 Mindful of the Supreme
Court’s approval of “reasonable means of promoting the public interest
in diversified mass communications,”444 Time Warner upheld a demand
that DBS operators set aside four to seven percent of their channel
capacity for noncommercial educational and informational
programming.445

435. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 629.
436. Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352 (4th Cir. 2001).
437. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000).
438. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 US. 689, 695 (1979) (affirming the Eighth Circuit’s
belief that “the Commission’s access, channel capacity, and facilities rules” presented First
Amendment concerns).
439. 47 U.S.C. §153(h) (2000). See generally CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
107–09 (1973) (chronicling the discussion surrounding radio broadcasters as common carriers
during the passage of the Communications Act of 1934).
440. 47 U.S.C. §326 (2000); see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 597–98 (1981)
(discussing the prohibition of censorship in the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act).
441. 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
442. Id. at 975 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994)).
443. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)).
444. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978); accord Time
Warner, 93 F.3d at 976.
445. See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 976 (describing this imposition as “hardly onerous”).
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Nothing about DBS as technological wonder dictated this result. If
anything, DBS promises to ease scarcity problems on multiple levels.
DBS boasts larger channel capacity. From the even more important
perspective of the geographically constrained consumer, DBS facilitates
intermodal competition for multichannel video programming delivery.
As the “first video technology with a national footprint” and the
corresponding opportunity “to exploit the cost efficiencies that
accompany national distribution” of programming, DBS “represents the
first technology capable of breaking” the grip of “local cable
monopolies.”446
In the name of preserving free, over-the-air broadcast television,
Congress has imposed must-carry obligations on DBS, 447 similar to
those borne by cable operators.448 DBS’s must-carry regime is called
“carry one, carry all.”449 In Satellite Broadcasting & Communications
Association v. FCC,450 the Fourth Circuit resolved a constitutional
challenge to “carry one, carry all” under the intermediate scrutiny
standard of O’Brien and the Turner litigation451 rather than the extreme

446. Yoo, supra note 108, at 343; see also Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to
Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. R EV. 885, 901 & n.37 (2003)
(contrasting satellite’s nationwide reach with cable’s local footprint and describing satellite as
“uniquely well suited to take advantage of the economies inherent in national distribution of video
programming”).
447. See 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2000) (regulating “secondary transmissions by satellite carriers within
local markets”); 47 U.S.C. §338(a)(1) (2000) (prescribing when satellite carriers prov iding
secondary transmissions under 17 U.S.C. § 122 must carry the signals of local broadcast stations).
448. The doubling of the amount of spectrum given to each incumbent broadcast station
“further cement[s] in place the role [of] broadcasting” in the market for video programming
delivery. Yoo, supra note 108, at 344; see also In re Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon
the Existing Television Broad. Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,820–21 (1997) (requiring broadcasters
to provide a “free digital video programming service” to the over-the -air services “on which the
public has come to rely”).
449. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act requires a satellite carrier to carry all
broadcast signals within a market once it carries any one broadcast signal within that market. Pub.
L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1051A-523 (1999); Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275
F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2001).
450. Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352 (4th Cir. 2001).
451. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994) (describing the
distinction between broadcasters and cable operators as one based “upon the manner in which
speakers transmit their messages . . . and not upon the messages they carry”); United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
[R]egulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
restriction . . . is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
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deference of NBC and NCCB.452 The Fourth Circuit’s unsurprising
conclusion—that “carry one, carry all” was narrowly tailored to advance
the putatively content-neutral goal of sustaining “independent [overthe-air] stations needed to provide . . . a rich mix of broadcast
programming from multiple sources”453 —admittedly foreclosed more
lenient scrutiny under NBC and NCCB. At the very least, Time
Warner’s contrary approach, which would have subjected structural
regulation of DBS to broadcasting ’s deferential standard, no longer
gives unequivocal support for treating DBS like broadcasting rather
than cable. But these decisions also provide no plausible reason for
analogizing DBS to conventional broadcasting (the better technological
analogue) or to cable (a closer functional or economic substitute).
The free-wheeling Internet provides a striking contrast. Unlike
broadcast and cable, the Internet’s logical architecture continues to
adhere, more or less, to the end-to-end principle.454 The true strength of
any end-to-end network lies in its stupidity. As befits a “stupid”
network455 or a “dumb pipe,”456 the logical layer of the Internet is
oblivious to content. By keeping intervening protocols as simple and
general as possible, end-to-end design drives a network’s “intelligence”
to its ends, where users load information and launch applications.457
Simple design and common protocols enable users to develop
applications ranging from peer-to-peer file sharing to e-commerce and
voice over Internet protocol.458 The resulting communications
environment is as fecund as it is diverse. The Internet thus harvests the
legacy of this country’s longstanding treatment of free speech as a
“transcendent value” based on a “robust exchange of ideas which

452. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799–802 (1978) (emphasizing
that there is no “‘unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast’” and holding that the FCC
may regulate “to promote the ‘public interest’”); FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 190, 210–18 (1943)
(explaining the FCC’s broad discretion to determine which uses of radio maximize the “public
interest, convenience, or necessity”).
453. Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n, 275 F.3d at 357.
454. See generally supra text accompanying notes 27–34 and sources cited therein.
455. See Isenberg, supra note 30, at 24.
456. Hatfield, supra note 97, at 1.
457. See Saltzer et al., supra note 27, at 277 (examining the “end-to-end argument” against
“low-level function implementation”).
458. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 10, at 932 (noting that “keeping the network simple, and
its interaction general” will “keep[] the cost of innovation low . . . [and] continue to facilitate
innovation”).
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discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues.’”459 Perhaps more than
any other aspect of contemporary communications, the end-to-end
principle’s commitment to structural openness animates the admonition
against applying “the regulatory frameworks established over the past
sixty years for telecommunications, radio and television [to] the
Internet.”460
The Internet resists partitioning, by speakers and would-be
regulators alike. As Justice Kennedy has recognized, “it is easy and
cheap to reach a worldwide audience on the Internet, but expensive if
not impossible to reach a geographic subset.”461 “Whereas traditional
scarcity of money and space require [sic] a library to make choices
about what to acquire,” observed Justice Souter in his dissent in United
States v. American Library Association, Inc.,462 “blocking is the subject
of a choice made after the money for Internet access has been spent or
committed.”463 By contrast, because access to the Internet is acquired in
one swoop, blocking “is not necessitated by scarcity of either money or
space.”464
In the electronic domain, to be sure, current technological
assumptions are unusually treacherous. “Experience has made it
axiomatic to eschew dogmatism in predicting the impossibility of
important developments in the realms of science and technology.
Especially when the incentive is great, invention can rapidly upset
prevailing opinions of feasibility.”465 “[S]olutions adequate a decade ago
are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be
outmoded 10 years hence.”466 The Internet’s current reliance on
“unified set[s] of code made available to everyone” may “change in the
future”; this fragile modus operandi can shift abruptly toward a
proprietary model.467 Under the jurisprudence of conduit-based
459. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
460. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 5 (1997).
461. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 595 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
462. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
463. Id. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting).
464. Id. (describing “the choice to block [as] a choice to limit access that has already been
acquired”).
465. RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 427 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring dubitante).
466. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
467. Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI .-K ENT L. R EV.
1257, 1288 (1998).
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regulation of speech, further privatization of the Internet carries
constitutional implications. Reno v. ACLU468 observed that the
Internet’s historic freedom from regulation warranted closer scrutiny of
the CDA vis-à-vis similar laws governing broa dcast.469 In the event of
constitutional conflict, a change in the Internet’s regulatory status will
change judicial attitudes. First Amendment protection shrinks as
messages and audiences become more private and therefore more
remote from public discourse.470 If private parties do partition the
Internet, First Amendment doctrine would almost surely grant the
speech-regulating “machinery of government” greater “play in its
joints.”471
A technologically savvy jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation
would classify DBS and the Internet according to their real-world
performance. But it is clear that these conduits’ legislative status is
driving their constitutional status. Such treatment effectively creates
“one long [legal] bootstrap.”472 Longstanding regulatory provisions have
now “become part of the constitutional baseline used to determine
whether a particular regulation violate[s] the First Amendment.”473 The
notion that the social meaning of a thoroughly regulated conduit
justifies further regulation not only engages in the circular illogic of
“[b]asing government control on government control”; it also “fail[s] to
distinguish spectrum from forms of property” beyond the government’s
reach.474 Rights in other scarce resources, most saliently land, are
determined by “a mode which neither necessitates nor tolerates a
regime like that of the FCC.”475 In a constitutional tradition that
tempers many rights accorded to owners of property but protects

468. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
469. See id. at 868–69 (noting that the Internet does share some of the factors that affect the
constitutionality of broadcast regulation, such as a “history of . . . regulation,” a “scarcity of
available frequencies,” and an “‘invasive’ nature”).
470. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. R EV. 603, 676–78 (1990)
(describing judicial consideration of “the intent of the speaker, the size of [the] speaker’s audience,
and the identity of the speaker” in crafting First Amendment protection for “the flow of
information to the public”).
471. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931); accord, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
472. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 548; see also id. at 554 (comparing the FCC’s licensing
system to allocation systems for scarce land resources).
473. Yoo, supra note 108, at 269–70.
474. Benjamin, supra note 84, at 51.
475. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 554.
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speech forthrightly,476 certain communicative conduits are regulated
more stringently than land. In a polity where “[g]overnment control is
not a justification for government control, but a response to some other
justification,” regulatory disparities should rest on legitimate factual
differences.477 The jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation reflects no
such rationality; it rests exclusively on historic path-dependency. Even
though land and spectrum present identical issues of scarcity and
rivalrousness, “it is only because the legal devices used in respect to land
have been so vastly different from those represented by the FCC that
we unthinkingly suppose that there must be some intrinsic
differences.”478
Over time, conduit-based regulation’s bootstrap becomes even
longer and more pernicious. Any explicit inclusion of regulatory
intensity in a constitutional test “creates a somewhat perverse incentive
for legislatures—regulate a medium in its infancy or lose your chance to
regulate at all.”479 Try as the law might in an industry’s embryonic stage
to avoid “an all or nothing-at-all choice,”480 any solicitude for ongoing
regulation, however modest, will favor preemptive regulation. From the
perspective of a legislator or regulator who can rationally anticipate
constitutional jurisprudence, “all other things will not be equal if waiting
means forfeiting the right to regulate.”481 In dynamic terms, this
“sinister” jurisprudence allows “regulation [to] serve as a constitutional
justification for more regulation” and to “reinforce an overriding
culture of regulation for its own sake.”482
4. Compelled speech as an illustration of a regulation’s
constitutional sig nificance. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the
interplay between regulation and free speech jurisprudence comes from
the seemingly distant doctrine that concerns compelled speech through
cooperative marketing. The First Amendment bars the government

476. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . .”), with id. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . .
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” (e mphases added)).
477. Benjamin, supra note 84, at 51.
478. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 555.
479. Benjamin, supra note 16, at 320.
480. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 769
(1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
481. Benjamin, supra note 16, at 320.
482. Yoo, supra note 108, at 356.
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from compelling individuals to express views contrary to their beliefs.483
The government may not coerce individuals to subsidize speech to
which they object,484 or even to be saddled with unwanted associates.485
Notwithstanding the compelled speech doctrine, the 1997 Supreme
Court case of Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.486 rejected a
First Amendment challenge to marketing orders that required
producers of tree fruit to pay assessments for generic advertising.
Wileman stressed “the importance of the statutory context”;487
nectarines, plums, and peaches are marketed under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,488 which “displaced many aspects of
independent business activity.”489 The tree fruit program forced
producers to contribute funds to cooperative advertising “as part of a
broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act
independently [was] already constrained by the regulatory scheme.”490
Indeed, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act “displaced
competition” so thoroughly that tree fruit marketing orders issued
under that statute’s authority and actions pursuant to those orders were
“expressly exempted from the antitrust laws.”491
Four years after Wileman, the Court again revisited the
constitutionality of compulsory cooperative advertising. The 2001 case
of United States v. United Foods, Inc.,492 contested a cooperative
marketing program for mus hrooms. Unlike the marketing scheme in
Wileman, the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer

483. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 706, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought . . .
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
484. E.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); Keller v. State Bar, 496
U.S. 1, 9–10 (1990); Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
485. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995)
(holding that a sponsor of a parade could not be compelled to include unwanted marchers).
486. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
487. Id. at 469.
488. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601–624, 671–674 (2000).
489. Wileman, 521 U.S. at 469.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 461. Absent contrary congressional instruction, “a detailed regulatory scheme” such
as the Marketing Agreement Act “ordinarily” suspends “antitrust scrutiny altogether.” Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004); accord
United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 697 (1975); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock
Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975).
492. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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Information Act493 imposed “no marketing orders that regulate how
mushrooms may be produced and sold, no exemption from the antitrust
laws, and nothing preventing individual producers from making their
own marketing decisions.”494 Indeed, the Mushroom Act dedicated
“almost all the funds collected under [its] . . . mandatory assessments” to
the exclusive purpose of “generic advertising.”495
The regulatory gap between the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act and the Mushroom Act proved constitutionally
decisive. Because the tree fruit program in Wileman “to a large extent
deprived producers of their ability to compete and replaced competition
with a regime of cooperation,” it enabled the government to demand
and collect “compelled contributions for germane advertising . . . in
furtherance of an otherwise legitimate program.”496 In United Foods, by
contrast, the principal objective of the Mushroom Act was “speech
itself.”497 All that was at stake was “a compelled subsidy” designed to
“mak[e] one entrepreneur finance advertising for the benefit of his
competitors.”498 The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act subjects
the tree fruit industry to such comprehensive regulation that
compulsory advertising assessments represent at most a modest
marginal imposition on pr oducers’ liberty. The Mushroom Act imposed
no such constraints, and as a result its advertising program fell before
the First Amendment’s razor.499
493. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6112 (2000).
494. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 414–15.
497. Id. at 415.
498. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).
499. In the doctrinal contest between Wileman and United Foods, the newer, more speechprotective decision appears to be prevailing. In the wake of United Foods, objecting farmers
successfully challenged other federal “checkoff” programs supporting generic advertisements. See,
e.g., Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) (dairy products), vacated sub nom.
Lovell v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005); Livestock Mktg. Ass’n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 713 (8th
Cir. 2003) (beef), vacated sub nom. Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Campaign for Family Farms,
125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005); Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003)
(pork), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055
(2005); cf. Orleans Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (allowing an
importer to challenge the constitutionality of the Beef Promotion and Research Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2901–2911 (2000), in the Court of International Trade). Comparable state programs for generic
advertising of table grapes, Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 318 F.3d 895, 899 (9th
Cir. 2003), and alligator products, Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423, 425 (5th Cir.
2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005), have also fallen. Only the dairy program appears to fall on
Wileman’s side of the line, insofar as dairy products have been subject for decades to the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. See generally Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340
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The contrast between Wileman and United Foods parallels the
contrast between the public interest model and less intrusive forms of
regulation. The less comprehensive the regulatory scheme, the greater
the scope of speech rights within the industry. The subtle slide from
Wileman toward United Foods signals a larger jurisprudential shift. The
argument that regulation of its own accord justifies more intrusive
conduit-based restraints on speech cannot be squared with the First
Amendment’s commitment to expressive liberty. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has suggested that comprehensive “regulation of [an]
industry . . . might well” sanction speech-restrictive regulation in that
industry.500 This posture is reminiscent of Justice Holmes’s argument
that the greater power to extinguish “the dedication” of public places
“to public uses” subsumes “the less [sic] step of limiting the public use
to certain purposes.”501 Under Justice Holmes’s approach, every public
forum case would follow the adage that “[t]he State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”502 Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s suggestion also echoes his opinion in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,503 which held that “the
(1984) (applying the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act to dairy products); Zuber v. Allen,
396 U.S. 168 (1969) (same); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939)
(same); Neil Brooks, The Pricing of Milk Under Federal Marketing Orders, 26 GEO. WASH. L.
R EV. 181 (1958) (discussing the regulation of milk prices under federal law); Reuben A. Kessel,
Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets, 10 J.L. & ECON. 51 (1967) (same). In
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005), the Supreme Court dismissed a First
Amendment challenge to the beef program by characterizing generic beef advertisements as
government speech immune from constitutional scrutiny, see id. at 2062. Johanns’s resolution of
this dispute left intact the essential holdings of Wileman and United Foods. See id. at 2058; cf. id. at
2066 (Thomas, J. concurring) (reaffirming Justice Thomas’s belief “that ‘[a]ny regulation that
compels the funding of advertising must be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment
scrutiny’” (quoting United States v. United States Foods Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 419 (2001) (Thomas, J.
concurring))). Under any approach, Wileman has no application to the beef program. The original
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 omitted beef from its list of “basic agricultural commodities,”
see Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 11, 48 Stat. 31, 38 (designating wheat, cotton, field corn, hogs,
rice, tobacco, milk, and dairy products); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 54 & n.2 (1937) (same),
and the federal government exerts far less influence over beef than milk or tree fruit. Joha nns
explicitly observed that the absence of a “‘broader regulatory system in place’ that collectivizes
aspects of the beef market unrelated to speech” rendered Wileman inapplicable to the beef
program. Joha nns, 125 S. Ct. at 2061 n.3 (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415).
500. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 196 (1999) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
501. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d sub nom. Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
502. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
503. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes
the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”504 This aspect
of Posadas, however, has been overruled in all but name; a later
coalition of four Justices, articulating what is arguably prevailing
doctrine on comme rcial speech, explicitly rejected Posadas’ “‘greaterincludes-the-lesser’ reasoning.”505 From public forum doctrine to
commercial speech, free speech jurisprudence has transcended
simplistic lesser-included-power arguments. To the extent that it rests
on the presumptive police power over private use of a conduit, the
jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation is comparably suspect.
C. Push, Pull, and Pervasiveness: Of Saturation and Social Meaning
One final factor remains: the pervasiveness and social meaning of
particular conduits of speech. 506 “Physical settings” in which speech
occurs “are not significant in the abstract”; they draw meaning from
“the social expectations and understandings associated with different
settings, the practices such spaces foster, and the relationships of those
practices to First Amendment values.”507 Speech does not take place in
“some abstract world uncontaminated by concrete social practices,” and
constitutionally meaningful “communicative acts” must be distinguished
from “social practices that do not carry any constitutional value.”508
Courts fret over potential public inferences of official endorsement
from the government’s legal presence within a conduit. Societal
awareness of broadcast regulation supposedly invites the audience to
presume official endorsement of messages in that medium, 509 whereas
504. Id. at 345–46.
505. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510–11 (1996) (plurality opinion); cf.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (curbing limits on advertising insofar as
“the tobacco industry has a protected interest in communicating information about its products
and adult customers have an interest in receiving that information”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476, 483 n.2 (1995) (reconciling the “greater-includes-the -lesser” aspect of Posadas with
the multifactor approach of Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980)).
506. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. R EV. 1503 (2000); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. R EV. 4 (1983); Lawrence Lessig,
The Regulation of Social Meaning , 62 U. CHI. L. R EV. 943 (1995); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights
Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA . L. R EV. 2021 (1996).
507. McGowan, supra note 7, at 1564.
508. Post, supra note 80, at 1274.
509. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 n.33 (1997) (acknowledging Judge Levanthal’s
concern over implicit approval of radio messages by the federal government); Pacifica Found. v.
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the corresponding regimes governing cable and the Internet do not.
Turner I cited “cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast
signals” in playing down the “risk that cable viewers would assume that
the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or
messages endorsed by the cable operator.”510 Reno observed that the
Internet, having remained free of the intense “government supervision
and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry,” would not
lead its users to “infer some sort of official or societal approval” within
that medium’s “vast democratic fora.”511 Denver similarly distinguished
between (traditionally regulated) public access channels and
(traditionally unregulated) leased access channels. Because cable
operators have historically enjoyed fewer “editoria l rights” over public
access channels, “the countervailing First Amendment interest is
nonexistent, or at least much diminished.”512
The logical layer of free speech jurisprudence often invokes
another factor closely related to social meaning: the conduit’s putative
“pervasiveness.” This factor most profoundly affects indecency cases.
The “uniquely pervasive” nature of broadcasting justifies temporal
restrictions on sexual or scatological humor.513 By contrast, the FCC
may not restrict nonobscene “dial-a-porn” that enters the home only
when “a caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication. ”514
Justice Stevens ’s observation that “the Internet is not as ‘invasive’ as
radio or television” virtually doomed the Communications Decency
Act.515 At least in the realm of indecency regulation, constitutiona lity
apparently hinges on the line between “push” and “pull” technologies,
between media that deliver information passively and those that await

FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 37 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Levanthal, J., dissenting) (suggesting that exposing
children to pornography or obscenity will suggest approval by parents or society), rev’d, 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
510. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
511. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868–69 & n.33.
512. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 761
(1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); see also Yoo, supra note 108, at 270–71 (quoting same).
Compare Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 189–90 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing the
definition of public, educational, and government access channels under 47 U.S.C. § 531), and
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 971–73 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), with Time Warner,
93 F.3d at 967–71 (describing the regime governing leased access channels).
513. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49 (recognizing the need to shield children from potentially
harmful material).
514. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
515. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869.
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user intervention.516 For instance, Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC517 invalidated restrictions on phone calls whose sexually
explicit content, though worthy of protection, lay much further from
core First Amendment concerns than did George Carlin’s ribald
political commentary.518 The most cogent distinction between Pacifica
and Sable lies in the nature of the two conduits: whereas broadcasting
provides “push” communications, the telephone is the ultimate “pull”
tool.
Many distinctions within the jurisprudence of conduit-based
regulation evidently hinge on the line between push and pull. That line
is becoming harder to draw, and its blurriness undermines the
distinction’s usefulness as a constitutional test. Technological flux
undermines legal assumptions about the passive or interactive nature of
any conduit. Indeed, to the extent that end-user technology is expanding
the domain of pull, government’s sphere of influence over expression
correlatively shrinks. The growing ability of “customers (in particular,
parents) to limit access” to entire categories in “interactive media”
should impair all types of content-based regulation, “whether it is
regulation of sexual expression, violence, commercial speech, or other
controversial materials.”519
Pervasiveness does not divide, but rather unites all forms of passive
communication—audio and video, wireline and wireless, analog and
digital. What Guglielmo Marconi envisioned as a “wireless
telegraph,”520 an airborne twist on an older pull technology, eventually
built radio’s empire of the air.521 Cable is at least as pervasive as overthe-air TV, and probably more so, because the presence of more
channels enables subscribers to watch more and to “surf” longer before
settling on a program.522 Video-on-demand “promises to transform
television from a ‘push’ technology” at least partially into “a ‘pull’
516. See generally ETHAN CERAMI , DELIVERING PUSH (1998) (surveying the use of the
Internet and other broadcast media as “push” technology); Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending
Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. R EV. 1048 (1997).
517. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
518. Id. at 128.
519. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 33, at 1634.
520. See EDWARD A. DOERING, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BROADCASTING V ERSUS FREEDOM
OF THE AIR 4 (1939) (noting how Marconi thought of radio as a ship-to-shore messaging system).
521. See THOMAS S.W. LEWIS, THE EMPIRE OF THE AIR: THE MEN WHO MADE RADIO
(1991) (chronicling the development of radio from telegraph).
522. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 745
(1996) (plura lity opinion) ([C]able subscribers tended to sample more channels before settling on a
program . . . .”).
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technology.”523 Now that Congress permits satellite retransmission of
local broadcast signals,524 cable and DBS are nearly perfect
substitutes.525
To be sure, the biggest divide in communications law separates
information viewed at twenty inches (typically a computer) from
information viewed at twenty feet (typically a television). “[T]he receipt
of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial.”526
Nevertheless, anyone who has been “mousetrapped” by pop-ups while
browsing the Web or whose e-mailbox has been “spammed” into
submission is likely to dispute the Internet’s characterization as a “pull”
technology. Wireless devices, once broadly deployed, will complete the
transformation of the Internet into a medium equally at home with
passive push as with active pull.527
If anything, telephony ’s status as the consummate pull technology
hangs by a slender legal thread. The telephone remains a pull
technology in significant part because the law so decrees. The
technological trifle of sending unsolicited faxes converts fax machines
into passive receptacles for information. The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA),528 however, makes it “unlawful . . . to
send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.”529
More recently, the TCPA and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994 (as amended in 2003)530 have

523. Yoo, supra note 108, at 305.
524. Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A523 to 1051A-544; Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 349 (4th Cir.
2001).
525. Admittedly, there may be significant supply -side differences between wireline and
wireless modes of transmission. Cf. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 319–20
(1993) (discussing the supply -side advantages that first-generation satellite providers enjoy).
526. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997); accord Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S.
564, 604 n.1 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting same).
527. See generally, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 195 (discussing the transformation of
communications technology into a combination of push and pull technology).
528. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
529. 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1) (2000); see also Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56
(9th Cir. 1994) (upholding the TCPA against a constitutional challenge).
530. Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 9b and 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6101–6108), amended by Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat.
557 and Act to Ratify the Authority of the Federal Trade Commission to Establish a Do-Not-Call
Registry, Pub. L. No. 108-82, 117 Stat. 1006 (2003).
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authorized a national do-not-call registry.531 States are rushing to
establish their own registries or to ride piggyback on the federal
campaign against unsolicited sales calls.532 Unwanted faxes and sales
calls combine some of the most despised traits of push technology
(unsolicited communication) with the most annoying aspect of pull (the
user’s need to interact—in this instance, by answering a ringing
telephone).
Nor does technology inherently shield the traditional telephone
from push uses. “Copper twisted pair” permits both push and pull; it
enables digital subscriber line (DSL) service as readily as voice
messages. Broadband access via DSL is “always on,” a typical push
trait.533 Legislative classification of cable broadband and voice over
Internet protocol as “information” services, “telecommunications ”
services, or both may further blur the already illusory distinctions
between wireline telephony, broadband, and multichannel video
programming delivery.534 In any event, legislative definitions do not
control the factual underpinnings of a First Amendment claim. 535
Even if it did establish a bright line among conduits, however, the
distinction between push and pull can carry only so much constitutional
weight. Other push technologies routinely intrude upon sensitive eyes

531. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2005) (forbidding calls to people on the Do Not Call
List); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (2005) (same ). See generally Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC,
358 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (dismissing statutory and constitutional challenges to the Do
Not Call List ), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004).
532. See, e.g., 2004 La. Sess. Law Serv. 857 (West) (establishing a Do Not Call List in
Louisiana ); ME. R EV. STAT . ANN. tit. 32, § 14716 (West Supp. 2003). See generally Patricia Pattison
& Anthony F. McGann, State Telemarketing Legislation: A Whole Lotta Law Goin’ On!, 3 WYO.
L. R EV. 167 (2003) (discussing recent legislation regulating the telemarketing industry).
533. See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2406 (1999)
(distinguishing between broa dband and narrowband in terms not only of transmission speed, but
also of a medium’s ability to remain “always on”); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978) (characterizing “the broadcast audience” as one that “is constantly tuning in and out” and
therefore one whom “prior warnings cannot completely protect . . . from unexpected program
content”).
534. See, e.g., Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating
cable broadband as an information service and as a telecommunications service, contrary to In re
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R.
4798, 4802 (2002), which defined it solely as an information service), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
But see Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000–01 (D.
Minn. 2003) (defining voice over Internet protocol solely as an information service).
535. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc. 466 U.S. 489, 505 (1984) (observing that
independent judicial determination of constitutionally significant acts helps “ensure that protected
expression will not be inhibited”).
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and ears.536 In almost any setting besides broadcasting, the usual
response to unwanted “bombardment of [one ’s] sensibilities” is an
admonition to “avert[] [one ’s] eyes”537 or to escort junk on the “short,
though regular, journey from mailbox to trash can.”538 Electronic
conduits equally enable an annoyed individual to “twist the dial” or
push a button “to cut off an offensive or boring communications.”539
There may be “captive audiences” worth protecting from “offensive
and intrusive” messages, even at the price of invasive speakers’
expressive freedom,540 but neither broadcast audiences nor Internet
users rank among them. Although drivers and mass transit passengers
may have no “choice or volition” to absorb such messages as are “thrust
upon them by all the arts and devices” of the dark science of marketing,
the “radio can be turned off.”541 Pacifica acerbically refused to ask
aggrieved listeners to “avoid further offense by turning off the radio, ”
regarding such an instruction as a facetious pronouncement “that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”542 Pacifica
vastly overestimated the difficulty of avoiding unwanted broadcasts.
“Turning off a radio is much easier than averting your eyes from
someone who is in the same room. Just try it sometime.”543 Efforts to
“reduce the adult population to reading only what is fit for children”544
are eviscerated by admonishing offended viewers to avert their eyes.
Invoking “the governmental interest in protecting children from
harmful materials. . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults.”545 We should not limit the
536. See Yoo, supra note 108, at 294–96 (discussing several examples of intrusive push
communications).
537. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); accord Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (finding no justification for a speech restriction when a sensitive viewer can
avert his or her eyes).
538. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 68, 72 (1983) (quoting Lamont v. Comm’r
of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
539. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
540. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 302, 304 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.) (distinguishing captive
audiences from those free to avoid undesired communications); Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The streetcar audience is a captive audience. It is
there as a matter of necessity, not of choice.”).
541. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) (Brandeis, J.).
542. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978).
543. Schauer, supra note 46, at 294.
544. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
545. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (citations omitted); accord Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S 525, 564 (2001).
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“level of discourse reaching a mailbox . . . to that which would be
suitable for a sandbox.”546
IV. AGAINST A DISTINCT JURISPRUDENCE
OF CONDUIT-BASED REGULATION
This Article rejects a distinct jurisprudence of conduit-based
regulation. At best, distinguishing speech cases by conduit fails to solve
basic doctrinal tensions. At worst, adopting a conduit-based approach
invites unduly speech-restrictive regulation. After describing how First
Amendment jurisprudence might look if stripped of this doctrine, I
advocate a unitary theory that respects no categorical distinctions based
on the conduit through which speech passes.
A. A Truly Transparent, “End-to-End” Approach to Conduit-Based
Regulation
A separate jurisprudence on conduit-based regulation is
unnecessary. A truly transparent, “end-to-end” approach that gives no
weight to conduit-specific regulation would perform better. The real
problem stems from the longstanding strategy of inspecting every novel
conduit before fixing the appropriate level of First Amendment review.
This practice, whose pedigree runs from NBC and Red Lion through
Reno v. ACLU, typifies the extensive but imperfectly limned
jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation. Somewhere between the
extremes of presumptive strict scrutiny for content-based regulation and
the radically weaker review devoted to restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of speech, the Court has sustained putatively economic
regulations of communicative conduits that also affect, as they must,
those conduits’ underlying content. Separating conduit-based
regulation’s concern with legitimate economic interests from its
censorial potential represents another variation on the fundamental
challenge of First Amendment doctrine within track one-and-one-half.
Two of the most recent cases in this sequence, United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,547 and the second case styled
Ashcroft v. ACLU,548 illustrate an underemphasized doctrinal theme.
Pacifica, Sable, Denver, Reno, Playboy, and Ashcroft II have all shown
that the Supreme Court is perfectly capable of detecting —and perhaps
546.
547.
548.

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
529 U.S. 803 (2000).
542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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even denouncing—content-based regulation of speech without regard
to conduit. “Regulation of content is not required to solve the technical
commons problem in airwave usage”549 or any other aspect of the
physical or logical infrastructure of communications. Physical challenges
do demand some degree of regulation. “Licensing is necessary for
engineering reasons; the spectrum is limited and wavelengths must be
assigned to avoid stations interfering with each other.”550 Courts,
however, must not transmogrify this narrow justification into a
bootstrap by which the government can leverage licensing into
unfettered content-based regulation. “[C]ensorship or editing or the
screening by Government of what licensees may broadcast goes against
the grain of the First Amendment.”551 Though it superficially honors
Red Lion’s admonition to focus on conduit, the Supreme Court has
never duplicated Red Lion’s feat of weakening scrutiny of contentbased regulation in any nonbroadcast conduit.552
Even within broadcasting, courts readily condemn overt, hamfisted control of content. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee553 rescued broadcasters from being
forced to accept paid editorial advertisements, reasoning that
mandatory carriage would degrade “the journalistic discretion of
broadcasters in the coverage of public issues.”554 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Douglas drew a cogent distinction between legitimate
and censorial regulation: “The Commission has an important role to
play in curbing monopolistic practices, in keeping channels free from
interference, in opening up new channels as technology develops. But it
has no power of censorship.”555 FCC v. League of Women Voters556
likewise invalidated an attempt to condition federal funding of public
television on broa dcasters’ abjuring of editorializing.557 Its reasoning

549. Hazlett, supra note 310, at 910–11.
550. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 157 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted).
551. Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
552. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing ,
1997 SUP. CT. R EV. 141, 146 (noting that the broadcasting cases have “little gravitational force”).
553. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
554. Id. at 124.
555. Id. at 162 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
556. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
557. Id. at 402.
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was simple: “scarcity of air time does not justify viewpoint-based
exclusion.”558
Courts have long exhibited the ability to pierce the veneer of
conduit-based regulation. The 1952 case of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson559 invalidated a ban on “sacrilegious” motion pictures.560 Burstyn
merits notice for its adroit handling of First Amendment claims unique
to a communicative conduit. Burstyn confronted a technological
phenomenon whose constitutional implications had previously
confounded the Supreme Court. In its first look at the movies, the Court
held in 1915 that “the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure
and simple, . . . not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country
or as organs of public opinion.”561 By 1952, however, the Court had not
only accumulated extensive experience with the movie industry’s
stormy relationship with antitrust,562 but also had come to treat “moving
pictures, like newspapers and radio” as part of “the press whose
freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.”563 The Court
proceeded to extend full constitutional protection. Although each
“particular method of expression” does “tend[] to present its own
peculiar problems,” Burstyn reasoned, “the basic principles of freedom
of speech and the press . . . do not vary.”564 In an era not known for its
dedication to expressive freedom,565 the Court acknow ledged that core
First Amendment principles “make freedom of expression the rule.”566
558. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 615 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998)).
559. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
560. Id. at 506; cf. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959)
(invalidating a ban on nonobscene portrayals of “sexual immorality [as] desirable, acceptable, or
proper . . . behavior”).
561. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915). This sentiment echoed a
contemporaneous proclamation that the “exhibitions of base ball . . . are purely state affairs” and
that transportation enabling games “between clubs from different cities and States” is “a mere
incident” to interstate commerce. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., v. Nat’l League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922).
562. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 231 (1939) (holding that
contracts effecting a “drastic suppression of competition and an oppressive price maintenance”
violate the Sherman Act).
563. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
564. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503.
565. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 115 (1961)
(“The Constitution does not prohibit the requirement that the Communist Party register with the
Attorney General as a Communist-action organization . . . .”); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 118 (1959) (“[I]n the domain of ‘national security’ the House has clothed the UnAmerican Activities Committee with pervasive authority to investigate Communist activities in
this country.”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951) (“To those who would paralyze
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Red Lion and Pacifica later cited Burstyn for the proposition that
“differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them.”567 Unlike either Red
Lion or Pacifica, though, Burstyn found “no justification . . . for making
an exception” to the rule of free expression. 568 Burstyn thereby
established a doctrinal model worth emulating. However nuanced the
judicial approach to the physical, legal, and social vagaries of each
conduit, courts should apply as much scrutiny as needed to “smoke out”
official efforts to control communicative impact.569 At a minimum,
courts should pay closer attention to the prospect that seemingly neutral
restrictions will perniciously affect content.570
On other occasions, the Supreme Court has dispatched contentbased restrictions with nary a glance at conduit. For instance, Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC571 bypassed the trivial ritual
of determining the proper level of First Amendment scrutiny for
restrictions on speech via telephone. Decided in 1989, Sable coincided
with the cable sequence that began in 1986 with Preferred
Communications572 and ended in 1997 with Turner II.573 Those cases,
unlike Sable, pondered the extent to which a new conduit should be
analogized to broadcasting. Indeed, telephony has largely eluded the
conduit-based strategy. The “extraordinary antitrust case” in which
long-distance upstart MCI sought interconnection with AT&T’s local
telephone networks574 raised no First Amendment issues besides those
implicit in the Noerr-Pennington antitrust defense.575 The legally
mediated “economic structure” of telephone companies as common

our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we must
reply that all concepts are relative.”).
566. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503.
567. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); accord FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
568. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503.
569. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate [classifications] by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”).
570. Alexander, supra note 47, at 930; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. R EV.
255, 296 (1992).
571. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
572. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
573. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
574. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 1983).
575. See id. at 1153–60 (“The [Noerr-Pennington] doctrine arose from the need to construe the
antitrust laws . . . to avoid a conflict . . . [with] the First Amendment.”).
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carriers “has resulted in a vast regime of rate regulation” and has
correlatively reduced telephone companies’ First Amendment rights in
content transmitted over their networks.576 Congress might be able to
subject even cable operators to common carrier obligations with respect
to “some of their channels,” if only because common carriage escapes
the constitutional “defect of preferring one speaker to another.”577
Truly neutral, generally applicable economic regulation typically
survives First Amendment review, even when it targets media
businesses. The First Amendment has never shielded media businesses
from labor and antitrust laws.578 Nor may cable operators escape
franchising requirements and rate regulation. 579 Indeed, no serious free
speech challenge involving the structural regulation of telephony arose
until the Bell operating companies soug ht to deliver video
programming.580 Traditional telephony and its regulation raise no

576. Burstein, supra note 86, at 1046. But cf. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: ContentBased Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. R EV. 57, 94–96 (arguing that telephone
companies could have asserted control as “publishers” before they were subjected to common
carriage).
577. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); accord Burstein, supra note 86, at 1043.
578. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (“The publisher of a newspaper
has no special immunity from the application of general laws. . . . He is subject to the anti-trust
laws.”); see, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (“The restraints
imposed by these private arrangements have no support from the First Amendment . . . .”); Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (“Injunctive relief under . . . the Sherman Act is
as appropriate a means of enforcing the Act against newspapers as it is against others.”);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.”); see also FCC v.
Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978) (“[A]pplication of the antitrust laws
to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values underlying, the
First Amendment.”). But cf. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace
of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001) (urging antitrust analysis to take account of the societal
impact of media concentration on expressive freedom). See generally C. EDWIN BAKER,
ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994) (advocating the aggressive application of
antitrust laws to private press monopolies insofar as threats to freedom of the press come from
private as well as governmental sources); C. EDWIN BAKER , MEDIA, MARKETS , AND
DEMOCRACY (2002) (arguing that the positive “political externalities” such as public service ideals
resulting from greater competition provide additional reasons to regulate media outlets).
579. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (opinion of
Randolph, J.) (“Almost from its inception in the 1950s, the cable industry has been subject to some
form of rate regulation.”).
580. E.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S.
1155 (1996); Pac. Telesis Group v. United States, 48 F.3d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516
U.S. 1155, 1155–56 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th
Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Noonan, J., dissenting) (describing the statutory bar to Bell company entry into video
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serious First Amendment concerns because issues such as an incumbent
carrier’s ability to provide long -distance service to local customers have
no expressive significance. Sometimes a medium is just a medium.581
The shield protecting ordinary economic regulation from First
Amendment scrutiny has worn thin. The doctrinal distinction may not
withstand the sheer amount of money in contemporary
communications. Partisans are determined to contest the economic
structuring of communications in constitutional terms, the better to
secure a legal arena for rehashing settled legislative battles.582 Some of
the most outlandish claims have arisen in the very market whose
immunity from First Amendment scrutiny seems most secure: lingering
disputes over the Bell breakup decree.583 In 1998 the Fifth Circuit had to
spike the fatuous argument that the Bell companies had somehow
become the victims of an unconstitutional bill of attainder.584 In 2002 the
Supreme Court dispelled “serious constitutional question[s]” over
whether any ratemaking “methodology [consciously] divorced from
investment actually made will lead to a taking of property.”585 This
proclamation effectively forecloses prominent arguments that
mandatory interconnection, unbundling, and resale violate incumbent
carriers’ constitutional rights.586

programming as “an irrational obstruction to the exercise of free speech”). The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 resolved this dispute by setting the terms under which the Bell
companies could battle cable operators through “open video systems.” See 47 U.S.C. §§ 571–573
(2000). See generally Glen O. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLUM. L. R EV. 1016 (1997).
581. Contra MARSHALL MCLUHAN , UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7
(1964) (“The medium is the message.”).
582. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (“Groups which find themselves unable
to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts.”).
583. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d mem. sub nom.
California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), terminated by
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143, reprinted in47
U.S.C. § 152 note (2000); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981). See generally
Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLUM.
L. R EV. 835, 850–59 (1997) (reviewing the history of the AT&T litigation); Joseph D. Kearney,
From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications
Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395 (1999) (reviewing the history of telecommunications
regulation from 1984 to 1996).
584. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998).
585. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002).
586. See J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER , DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
R EGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF N ETWORK INDUSTRIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 308 (1997) (arguing that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “could pose
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The weakness of strategies rooted in the contracts and takings
clauses encourages partisans in high-stakes media markets to promote a
distinct and robust First Amendment jurisprudence on conduit-based
regulation. First Amendment arguments tend to be more respectable
than other constitutional strategies, if only because free speech
represents the final redoubt of an extensive libertarian tradition that
once justified vigorous judicial vindication of economic due process.587 If
anything, the First Amendment has apparently “become the first line of
challenge for virtually all forms of regulatory initiatives.”588 Critics warn
that “[f]reedom of speech is becoming a generalized right against
economic regulation of the information industry.”589 The real trick is to
preserve freedom of speech without succumbing to the First
Amendment’s Lochnerian potential.
In an effort to curb the First Amendment’s critical power, Jus tice
Breyer has distinguished between “pure economic regulation” and
“regulation of expression”: “what may count as rational where
economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus
on expression—in a Nation constitutionally dedicated to the free
dissemination of speech, information, learning, and culture.”590 The
takings que stions”); Spulber & Yoo, supra note 446, at 938–42 (attempting to locate incumbent
carriers’ constitutional complaints within the physical takings doctrine of Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
587. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. R EV. 949, 952
(1995) (“[C]onstitutional liberties might be interpreted to mandate deregulation in both the
economic marketplace and the marketplace of ideas. In this . . . libertarian view, contemporary
First Amendment law rests on better political theory than does the law of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
588. Robinson, supra note 82, at 944.
589. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1, 27–28 (2004); see also Yochai
Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 201 (2003) (“As the information economy and society
have moved to center stage, the First Amendment is increasingly used to impose judicial review on
all regulation of this sphere of social and economic life.”); Burstein, supra note 86, at 1032
(“Lochner-like scrutiny is inappropriate in media regulation cases, where there are legitimate
speech interests on both sides of the dispute.”); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. R EV. 462 (1998) (“[T]he economic
vision embodied in Lochner is alive and well on the digital frontier.”); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. R EV. 767, 771–72 (2001) (arguing that the intermediate
scrutiny test of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), is malleable enough to Lochnerize
even the speed limit).
590. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244–45 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 429 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe the
First Amendment seeks to limit the Government’s economic regulatory choices . . . any more than
does the Due Process Clause.”); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. R EV.

012306 02_CHEN.D O C

2005]

2/6/2006 10:18 AM

CONDUIT-BASED REGULATION

1445

Supreme Court “has recognized the strong governmental interest in
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may
have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association.”591 Such
laws are supposedly “not content related” insofar as they seek “to
promote free speech, not to restrict it.”592 By contrast, allowing
government to sort would-be speakers “on the basis of their political,
economic or social views” would present a “wholly different” issue.593
Justice Stevens has distinguished between “policy judgments . . .
intended to forestall the abuse of monopoly power” and laws that
“regulate[] the content of speech rather than the structure of the
market.”594 Many commentators likewise rely on the distinction
between structural and content-based regulation.595 One commentator
would toss “[b]roadcasting, insofar as it deals with entertainment,” into
“the same boat as lipstick,” subject to market-driven tides determining
which “brand and shade will prevail.”596 Yet the prospect that “a
majority vote” might determine public access “to information and
news” is greeted with horror.597
Sentiments favoring aggressive conduit-based regulation find their
most powerful expression in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for

245, 255–56 (2002) (condemning the potential restoration of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), in “modern First Amendment guise”).
591. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982); accord FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n., 493 U.S. 411, 428 n.12 (1990).
592. FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 801 (1978).
593. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
594. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 671 n.2 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[M]easures that . . . have only
incidental effects on speech merit greater deference than those supporting content-based
restrictions on speech.”).
595. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 414, at 163–64 (noting that “the critical, first inquiry” upon
which the Court has often focused is “whether a particular regulation is content-based”);
Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 348, at 873 (arguing that structural regulation is inherently
different from content-based regulation); Burstein, supra note 86, at 1032–33, 1057 (ma intaining
that while “courts ought to be gene rally deferential to legislative judgments about the economic
structure of speech delivery,” they must simultaneously “guard vigilantly against encroachment on
media entities’ expressive choices”).
596. CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST R EGULATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK 145 (2000).
597. Id.; cf. N EIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE
AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS 99–113 (1985) (lamenting popular reliance on television as a primary
source of news); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. R EV. 499, 514–15
(2000) (lamenting how reliance on advertising as the media’s primary financial mechanism has
compelled the “commodification of eyeballs”).
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Broadcasting (NCCB),598 the 1978 case that upheld a ban on
broadcast/newspaper cross-ownership in the name of “the ‘public
interest’ in diversification of the mass communications media.”599
NCCB’s standard of review is not perceptibly tougher than the minimal
scrutiny directed at “the prohibitions imposed by the antitrust laws” as
applied to media businesses.600 In declaring that “‘“efforts to enhance
the volume and quality of coverage” of public issues’ through regulation
of broadcasting may be permissible where similar efforts to regulate the
print media would not be,” NCCB also marked the apogee of the
enhancement theory.601 Lower courts routinely describe NCCB as
subjecting “‘structural’ regulation of the broadcast industry” to
“[m]inimal scrutiny.”602 At most, constitutional scrutiny in broadcasting
ranges from “purely content-based” to “purely structural,” while
scrutiny tightens “with the extent to which a challenged provision relies
on the identity of the speaker or the content of the covered speech. ”603
Since 2002, several federal courts have invoked NCCB in cases
involving restrictions on broadcast ownership. The FCC’s rules on local
television station ownership, 604 national television station ownership,605
and broadcast media cross-ownership606 have all survived First
Amendment attacks. For instance, the ban on “any entity from
controlling television stations the combined potential audience reach of
which exceeds 35%” of television-viewing households nationwide 607 “is
not a content-based regulation; it is a regulation of industry structure,
like the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule the Court concluded
was content-neutral in NCCB, and like the network ownership

598. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
599. Id. at 799.
600. Id. at 800 n.18; e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139–40 (1969);
United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 351–52 (1959); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951).
601. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 800 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50–51 & n.55 (1976) (per
curiam) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969))).
602. Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
603. Id. at 255 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800,
810–814 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing the full range of potentially applicable constitutional
standards).
604. Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 168–69 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
605. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
606. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402 (3d Cir. 2004).
607. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2004).
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restriction upheld in NBC.”608 In upholding the local television
ownership rules, the D.C. Circuit asked solely whether a structural rule
of this nature is “rationally connected to [the] goals of ensuring a
diversity of voices and adequate competition in television
broadcasting.”609
Courts do not apply NCCB and NBC, however, when reviewing
similar structural rules in other media industries. In a 2001 challenge to
FCC rules on horizontal and vertical aspects of cable television
ownership and operation, 610 the D.C. Circuit eschewed NBC and NCCB
in favor of the intermediate scrutiny standard articulated in United
States v. O’Brien.611 These cable rules, no less comprehensive in their
reach than corresponding rules in broadcasting, failed to pass the
tougher test. In striking the 30 percent horizontal limit on subscribers
nationwide that any set of commonly owned and operated cable systems
may reach, the D.C. Circuit found “nothing in the record supporting a
non-conjectural risk of anticompetitive behavior” among affiliated cable
systems.612 The court likewise struck down vertical limits on the number
of channels that any cable operator may assign to programmers in which
the operator holds an attributable interest.613
To like effect, the Fifth Circuit in 1999 invalidated a municipal fee
for non-locally produced programming on a public/educational/
governmental (PEG) cable channel.614 The appeals court described the
fee as “a content-neutral regulation which implement[ed] a significant
governmental interest in promoting localism.”615 This is the deferential
rhetoric of NBC and NCCB. The court compared the fee to Turner
litigation’s must-carry rule, reasoning that a fee that “subsidizes” a PEG
channel “and substitutes for the local resources that could otherwise be
utilized to produce programs” rests on “an independent economic basis
more closely analogous to the content-neutral must-carry rule than a

608. Fox , 280 F.3d at 1046; see also id. (“[T]he deferential review undertaken by the Supreme
Court in NCCB and NBC is also appropriate here.”).
609. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 168.
610. See 47 U.S.C. §533(f)(1) (2000) (ordering the FCC to promulgate such rules and
regulations).
611. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
612. Id. at 1136.
613. Id. at 1139 (“[T]he FCC has failed to justify its vertical limit as not burdening substantially
more speech than necessary.”).
614. Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 195–96 (5th Cir. 1999).
615. Id. at 189.
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purely [sic] content-related localism preference.”616 As in the D.C.
Circuit’s cable case, however, this decision’s invocation of O’Brien
proved fatal. Given no evidence regarding “the amount of revenue
generated from the fee, the number of providers who have been
charged the fee, or whether the fees have actually” advanced local
programming,617 the Fifth Circuit invalidated the fee for failure to satisfy
O’Brien’s narrow tailoring prong.618
The contrast between NCCB’s controlling effect in broadcasting
cases and its inapplicability in cable cases exposes the flaw in Justice
Breyer’s proposed distinction between structural and expressive
regulation. NCCB does nothing more than parrot Red Lion’s assertion
that broadcasting alone may be lawfully subjected to structural
regulation whose censorial potential is unacceptable in any other
setting. Unexamined categorical distinctions between conduits offer a
wholly unsatisfying alternative to the standing First Amendment trick of
vacillating between strict scrutiny on track one and judicial de ference on
track two. “[T]he issue would be totally different” if regulators were to
rest their decisions “upon the basis of [would-be speakers’] political,
economic or social views.”619 Yet NCCB’s endorsement of enhancement
theory gives the lie to the idea that structural regulation is inherently
content-neutral.620 To the extent that government structures media
markets to affect content, courts should apply strict scrutiny.
Even absent lower court elaboration, the weaknesses in the
jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation are evident from Supreme
Court cases. Turner provides the leading illustration. Although Turner I
endorsed Red Lion’s methodology in searching for a conduit-specific
approach to cable, the Turner cases placed exclusive emphasis on
cable’s physical characteristics. This method stands in stark contrast
with Red Lion’s more nuanced technique. In concert, the Turner
decisions represent the most emphatic rejection of Red Lion’s
analogical approach. Alone among the Supreme Court’s decisions,
Turner I insisted that Red Lion involved nothing but physical scarcity,
as though the physical characteristics of spectrum alone justified the
616. Id. at 194.
617. Id. at 195.
618. See id. at 195 (“Access has failed to demonstrate narrow tailoring of the fee rule as a
matter of law.”).
619. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943); accord FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for
Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 801 (1978).
620. See NCCB, 436 U.S. at 799–800 (maintaining that the physical limitations of the broadcast
spectrum demand structural regulation).
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fairness doctrine. That assertion does not withstand a careful reading of
Red Lion and its successor cases. Although Turner I declined to hinge
First Amendment analysis solely on the presence of a monopoly,621 it
also ignored the impact of the law on cable ’s economic structure and
expressive performance. By contrast, Red Lion counseled consideration
of rivalrousness and of regulatory intensity in every First Amendment
review of official efforts to structure a conduit’s operative logic.
Turner I’s deepest pitfall, however, lay in its rendering of the
balance between legislative discretion and judicial supervision.
“Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when
First Amendment rights are at stake.”622 Ceteris paribus, the Supreme
Court gives far less weight to legislative fia t than to individual conduits’
functional peculiarities. At a minimum, Turner II evidently sought to
reverse this presumption through its application of intermediate
scrutiny to must-carry.623
To be sure, the Supreme Court had already conceded its otherwise
plenary command over the factual foundations of First Amendment
disputes in FCC v. League of Women Voters,624 which declined to
overrule Red Lion “without some signal from Congress or the FCC that
technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of
the system of broadcast regulation may be required.”625 But the Turner
cases extended judicial abdication to settings beyond broadcasting. If
anything, Turner calibrated judicial independence in inverse proportion
to the innovative potential of the disputed technology. What Turner I
had called “substantial deference to the predictive judgments of
Congress”626 acquires “special significance in cases . . . involving
congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent
complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries

621. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994).
622. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia , 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978); accord Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (prescribing independent judicial review of factual
determinations underlying a First Amendment claim); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 509 (1996) (plurality opinion) (refusing to defer to legislative prerogative in “choos[ing]
suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy”); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (withholding deference from an agency
interpretation that raised serious First Amendment questions).
623. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 195–213 (1997).
624. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
625. Id. at 376 n.11.
626. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665.
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undergoing rapid economic and technological change.”627 Of course,
Red Lion also fell into the same trap. But Turner I aggravated the
problem through unilateral judicial disarmament.
Worse still, Turner I insisted that “Congress granted must-carry
privileges to broadcast stations [solely] on the belief that the broadcast
television industry [was] in economic peril due to the physical
characteristics of cable transmission.”628 Having forsworn the portion of
Red Lion which would have counseled attention to “the Government’s
role in allocating [broadcast] frequencies,”629 the Court ignored how
“Congress preferred broadcasters over cable programmers based on the
content of programming each group offers.”630 Despite its centrality to
this dispute, broadcasting and cable ’s shared regulatory past contributed
almost nothing to Turner.
If Turner I’s shortcomings concerned nothing besides must-carry,
the resulting misalignment of cable and broadcasting would only
modestly affect communications law at large. Cable’s greatest
competitors today are local telephone companies (in the broadband
market) and satellite broadcasters (in the multichannel video
programming delivery market). But Turner’s missteps matter in the
same way that the larger body of broadcasting law still matters. Turner
erred in two significant ways: first by stressing solely the physical
differences between cable and broadcast, and second by ignoring the
content-based motivation underlying must-carry. Both of these failings
grew from the failure to perceive how the law structures conduit in ways
beyond those dictated by strictly physical characteristics.
Conduit-based regulation of speech is a constitutional mirage. It
represents no genuinely distinct category of First Amendment doctrine.
Conduit-based regulation raises precisely the same issues as all other
decisions revie wable under the First Amendment. Treating conduitbased regulation as a distinct category does almost nothing to resolve
the First Amendment’s considerable doctrinal difficulties.
Discrimination on the basis of content does not and should not acquire
sudden immunity merely because speech passes through a less
privileged conduit. To be sure, distinct conduits raise distinct regulatory

627. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 196.
628. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 659.
629. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 397 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
630. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 658–59. See generally Lawrence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable,
and Beyond—Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 25–45 (1997)
(documenting the case for treating must -carry as content-based regulation).
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concerns, ranging from strictly physical characteristics to economic
predictions regarding markets that exploit that conduit. Persuasive free
speech jurisprudence considers differences of this sort. Condensing
these nuances into deceptively convenient categories such as
“broadcasting,” however, blunts judicial initiative to engage in
contextual analysis. Over time, the factors that once might have justified
more aggressive intervention in broa dcasting may have changed or even
evaporated. The mere invocation of cases such as Red Lion, NBC, and
NCCB, however, effectively ends any reasoned discussion of whether
structural regulation of broadcasting deserves closer scrutiny or, for that
matter, whether comparable efforts to structure nonbroa dcast markets
warrant the deference he retofore reserved for broadcasting. Treating
conduit-based regulation as a distinct First Amendment concept invites
the application of per se rules, in both directions, when what is truly
needed is a constitutional rule of reason.
Controversies over conduit-based regulation of speech have made
two doctrinal contributions. First, these cases have instructed courts to
study the conduit in which speech is transmitted, being prepared if
necessary to dilute constitutional protection for the expression of ideas.
Second, these cases have concluded that one conduit among many —
broadcasting —has historically merited less rigorous review on account
of rivalrousness in the use of spectrum, the industry’s regulatory history,
and the public’s interest in access to this unique but highly controlled
conduit.
Almost all objections to Red Lion and the broadcast model have
addressed the second aspect of the conduit-based cases. Whether Red
Lion erred in its initial assessment of broadcasting and whether that
analysis is obsolete today are both beside the point. It is Red Lion’s
apology for a separate jurisprudence on conduit-based regulation of
speech whose time has passed. Technology evolves, but the
irreconcilable imperative of protecting expressive freedom while
accommodating the regulation of noncommunicative concerns will
endure forever.
B. Toward a Unitary Theory of Free Speech
“It would be convenient if there were some principle demarcating
the line between those activities and resources” that directly facilitate
speech “and those that do not.”631 In reality, there is no clean division
631.

Williams, supra note 53, at 723.
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between content and conduit. The “almost metaphysical” distinctions
on the continuum from the purely physical to the purely expressive
provide “no clear dividing line between facilitative aspects of speech
and other activities.”632 “[I]t is both theoretically difficult and practically
impossible to separate the uniqueness of a particular message from the
uniqueness of a particular audience at a particular time and place . . . .
The facilitative and the expressive, the media and the message, are
ultimately inseparable.”633
The impossibility of coherent First Amendment doctrine is
emerging as one of those truths susceptible of mathematical proof.
“Deriving a consistent theory of the First Amendment from the myriad
opinions of the Supreme Court represents a task similar to defining the
inside and outside of a Möbius strip; that which appears logical at one
point evaporates from another perspective.”634 To its credit, the
jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation acknowledges the
intractability of its own quest. Static technological limits, the economic
rivalrousness of competing uses, the history and nature of governmental
regulation, the pervasiveness and social meaning of a conduit—all of
these factors inform this absurdly convoluted constitutional project.
And this is to say nothing of predicting the tortuous path of
technological change. As much as the broadcast model has crippled the
market for video programming and delivery, the dynamic effect of the
conduit-based strategy on legal evolution and the pace of technological
innovation may be even more dramatic.635
“[F]ully to comprehend” the vast field of contempor ary
communications “would require an almost universal knowledge ranging
from” engineering and economics “to the niceties of the legislative,
judicial, and administrative processes of government.”636
Foundationalist responses cannot encompass the full “web of values,

632. Id. at 724.
633. Alexander, supra note 47, at 928.
634. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 141, at 68; Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 548. Professor Van
Alstyne credited a student of his, William Parker, as the author of this perfect metaphor. So do I.
635. Cf. Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
703, 721 (1997) (lamenting that “current discussions on regulatory reform” fail to “give adequate
attention to considerations of dynamic efficiency”); Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects
of Economic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1449, 1484 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (lamenting how “little effort has been devoted to
measuring the effects of regulation on innovation and productivity growth”).
636. Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1943) (directing
these observations toward governmental regulation of the dairy industry).
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collectively comprising our understanding of how people should live.”637
Yet the core of this task is simple enough to be expressed in a single
sentence. Our First Amendment rests squarely on “[o]ur profound
national commitment to the free exchange of ideas.”638 What is true in
popular music is equally true in constitutional law: “The hardest to
learn” really is “the least complicated.”639
Controversies over conduit-based regulation of speech cannot be
resolved by traditional constitutional tools. “The Framers of the First
Amendment surely did not foresee the advances in science” underlying
contemporary conduit-based controversies.640 Courts enjoy enormous
freedom to engage in highly contextual, ad hoc judgments that hinge
more on evanescent technology than on immanent and durable verities.
Like any other social institution, the law must adapt to technological
change. A single human generation typically provides ample time for
the Supreme Court to complete a constitutional hiccough. Yet
assurances that legal change will come in a quarter-century buy nothing
in this land. 641 A polity whose modern prophet decreed that justice
delayed is justice denied does not count patience among its national
virtues.
Law “must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and
morals.”642 We could seek cheap refuge in “[n]ew technology,”
invariably “the easy answer to everything.”643 Technological
637. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. R EV. 1615, 1641 (1987); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:
Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law, 45 V AND. L. R EV. 533, 553–54 (1992) (“Formalism errs
when it seeks to convert context-specific practical considerations . . . into a noncontextual
interpretive method.”).
638. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989); accord
Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
639. INDIGO GIRLS, Least Complicated, on SWAMP OPHELIA (Sony 1994); see also Jim Chen,
Rock ‘n’ Roll Law School, 12 CONST . COMMENT . 315, 319 (1995) (“There are rock rules in free
speech—so much so that rock rules in free speech.”).
640. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
641. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary . . . .”), with id. at 375 (Thoma s, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While I agree that in 25 years the practices of the Law
School will be illegal, they are [also] . . . illegal now.”).
642. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 310, at 43.
643. Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 643
(1995); see also Fred H. Cate, Telephone Companies, the First Amendment, and Technological
Convergence, 45 DEPAUL L. R EV. 1035, 1065 (1996) (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly
assumed that technological differences among media involved may justify diminished application
of the First Amendment.”); Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and
Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. R EV.
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convergence among “terrestrial broa dcasting, satellite broadcasting,
coaxial cable,” wireline telephony ’s “twisted pair,” and other media still
being refined or invented will render meaningless not only “any
remaining distinctions between . . . various media technologies” but also
“any continued effort to draw [legal] distinctions among media.”644 In
times of technological upheaval through “[c]onstant revolutionizing of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions,
everlasting uncertainty and agitation,” all “fixed, fast, frozen relations,
with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are
swept away.”645
Architecture, it bears repeating, is destiny. The architecture of our
greatest conduit teaches a vital constitutional lesson. “The Internet . . .
offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity.”646 The end-to-end concept animating the versatile
and volatile Internet should inform First Amendment doctrine. End-toend wisdom drives all intelligence in free speech jurisprudence to the
ends—equally to speakers and to their audiences—at the expense of
governmental efforts to modulate the logic of the conduit through
which ideas are transmitted.
Red Lion and Justice Thomas are each half-correct. Red Lion
insisted that “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount.”647 Justice Thomas has declared
to the contrary that “[i]t is the operator’s right that is preeminent.”648
These dueling propositions express a joint truth: guaranteeing
expressive freedom among producers as well as consumers of
976, 976 (1997) (“In recent years, both the Supreme Court and the Congress have made much of
the rapid pace of technological change within the tele communications industry.”).
644. Yoo, supra note 108, at 283; see also Yoo, supra note 117, at 289 (“The impending shift of
all networks to packet-switched technologies promises to cause all . . . distinctions based on the
means of conveyance . . . to collapse entirely.”).
645. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 54 (Signet Classics ed.
1998) (1848).
646. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2000); accord Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 566
(2002).
647. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
648. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 816
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 813 (condemning Red
Lion and its successors as beacons on a “doctrinal wasteland”); cf. Newton N. Minow, Address to
National Association of Broadcasters (1961) (describing television as a “vast wasteland”), quoted in
JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198 (1991), and
N EWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LA MAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN,
TELEVISION , AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 188 (1995).
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information depends on minimizing the government’s role in
encumbering conduits with embedded expressions of official
“intelligence.” “Our Constitution does not permit the official
suppression of ideas.”649 The Constitution provides scarcely more room
for the official expression of ideas, especially when governmental
preferences effectively marginalize private expression. First
Amendment jurisprudence has allowed certain expressive conduits to
drown in a thick layer of government-initiated “code,” in the stultifying
structural “logic” of broadcast licensing in the “public interest.”
Allowing the government too much power to “tell[] us what to say or
hear for our own good” threatens to “deform[] the entire democratic
process.”650
Not for naught has the Supreme Court described the “right to
speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs” as “one of
the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”651
Speech, “often provocative and challenging” and invariably free by law,
is intended “to invite dispute,” particularly “when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger.”652 Free speech “may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea.”653
Within a guarantee of free speech spanning the communicative
experience, from its roots in the physical world to its transformation
within the mind of the perceiver, “only a unitary First Amendment for
all media will do.”654 The principles that have kept print media free
throughout the history of the Republic should apply equally to new
media.655 A unitary free speech jurisprudence leaves no room for a
distinct logical layer, for the clumsy cluster of existing doctrines on
conduit-based regulation. The very presence of a free speech
jurisprudence of conduit-based regulation invites government to shape

649. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis
added and omitted).
650. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L.
R EV. 579, 651 (2004).
651. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1740 (1995).
655. See id. (“[T]he general principles of law and regulation underlying all nonbroadcast mass
media would be just as workable, and should be fully applied, to the broadcast media.”).
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speech according to its own vision of the good life. Normatively
speaking, however, courts should stop endorsing conduit-based
regulation. Resistance to official control of the means and
manifestations of imaginative expression represents the brightest of
“fixed star[s] in our constitutional constellation.”656
Adopting a unitary First Amendment would admittedly force us to
gamble in matters of public governance. All law is an experiment, as “all
life is an experiment.”657 First Amendment jurisprudence should err in
favor of and not against the right to speak. Such is the lesson taught by
the basic structure of First Amendment doctrine: we begin with
presumptive strict scrutiny and then find reasons to ratchet down. From
that list of excuses, conduit-based regulation should be struck. Many
governmental efforts to regulate conduits and media markets would run
afoul of the First Amendment. The First Amendment’s commitment to
“free trade in ideas” rests on the belief that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”658 In this marketplace of ideas, the “forum where ideas and
information flourish,” it is “the speaker and the audience, not the
government, [who] assess the value of the information presented. ”659
CONCLUSION
“Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”660 Under a
Constitution that runs as a covenant across the ages, “[e]ach
generation” must reject “anew . . . ideas and aspirations” not fit to
“survive more ages than one.”661 A separate First Amendment
jurisprudence on conduit-based regulation deserves to wither away. A
generation ago, William Van Alstyne presciently “repudiat[ed] the
doleful view that we are helpless captives of night riders on the air or
that we need protection from every political charlatan who may seek to
corrupt us with 1,000 watts of radio power.”662 Today and tomorrow,

656. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
657. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
658. Id.
659. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); accord Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999).
660. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
661. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
662. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 575.
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“[i]f we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be
bold.”663

663.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

